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Maine has a long and proud history of working waterfronts and commercial fishing. 
However, in recent decades, aquaculture, or the harvesting or growing of aquatic life, has 
emerged as another player in the coastal economy. Globally, aquaculture is experiencing the 
fastest growth of any food sector in the world as it subsidizes floundering wild-capture fisheries 
(FAO, 2014). Maine and the rest of the United States have not yet participated in this growth, 
which has led stakeholders and policymakers like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) to advocate for massive improvements to the sector by 2020 (NOAA, 
2016). To ensure the possibility of sustainable growth, it is critical that the economic and social 
impediments are well understood. This thesis addresses two very different issues facing the 
aquaculture industry in Maine as it seeks to expand: the need for aquaculture growers to 
subsidize their income with off-farm labor and differences in community acceptance of 
aquaculture.  
 Chapter 2 examines the proclivity of oyster growers in New England to participate in off-
farm labor. Off-farm labor is considered to be an important risk-hedging strategy, especially in 
an industry where crop insurance is not yet available. Data is collected from a 2016 mixed-mode 
survey conducted by the University of Maine’s School of Economics across all oyster growers in 
Maine and Massachusetts (Scuderi & Chen, 2017). We explore how the growers’ personal, 
  
social, and business characteristics influence the likelihood of participating more or less in off-
farm income generating activities. In addition, we borrow from a broad literature of agricultural 
off-farm labor supply studies to develop a framework for analyzing the off-farm labor decision 
specifically for aquaculture-based industries. The results indicate that a grower’s age, education, 
gender, business size, and experience all play an important role in determining participation in 
income generating activities on and off-farm. We also find that learning and information sharing 
within the aquaculture industry can decrease off-farm labor participation. These results can offer 
insights for policymakers by providing information about what grower characteristics influence 
their ability to work on-farm. 
 Chapter 3 looks to examine community-level differences in acceptance of aquaculture 
across three coastal regions: Casco Bay, Damariscotta River region, and Penobscot Bay. Each 
region’s economy is composed of many stakeholder groups who hold heterogenous preferences 
over aquaculture. These groups compete for limited coastal space such that changes in the 
coastal landscape can change the distribution of winners and losers. We build off the work of 
Evans et al. (2017) that uses hedonic price analysis to look at the impacts of small changes in 
aquaculture production on the coastal landscape. This work is extended by acknowledging that 
some policymakers and stakeholders are interested in growing Maine’s aquaculture production in 
a nonmarginal fashion, a problem that requires a new set of tools to fully understand. A pure-
characteristics equilibrium sorting model is utilized to investigate how observed large-scale 
changes in marine aquaculture might impact housing markets. A dataset composed of all coastal 
household transactions between 2012 and 2014 is used to investigate how coastal homeowners 
perceive aquaculture. Results show that relative changes in community price are induced when 
the utilization of coastal space changes. However, these results are muddied by an endogenous 
relationship between aquaculture and commercial fishing activities. 
 ii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
 Aquaculture is playing a role in changing Maine’s coastal landscape. Aquaculture 
producing activities can provide economic opportunities to communities who have traditionally 
relied on commercial fishing, especially for those fisheries that have been negatively affected by 
climate change and decades of overfishing. Aquaculture has become an increasingly important 
source of seafood protein throughout the world and the benefits of expanding marine aquaculture 
production have not been lost on U.S. policymakers. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) has called for a 50% increase in aquaculture production by 2020, a call 
that has resonated with many U.S. policymakers and stakeholders. This sentiment has been 
echoed by policymakers and stakeholders within the State of Maine who hope the local industry 
can participate in this rapidly expanding global market. Unfortunately, these benefits have not 
been fully realized because of a complex set of relationships between other coastal resource users 
and aquaculture growers as well as the economic volatility inherent to operating small 
aquaculture operations. By examining both of these inhibitions to industry growth, this research 
provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges facing the expansion of Maine’s 
aquaculture industry from a social science perspective.  
1.2. Purpose of research  
This research identifies two very different problems that need to be considered if aquaculture 
industries in Maine are to develop sustainably. This work hopes to help guide that process in 
several ways. First, we hope that Maine’s stakeholders and policymakers find the results of this 
research helpful and informative when considering how to help growers weather an uncertain 
and sometimes tumultuous landscape. While we refrain from making any explicit policy 
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recommendations, results may be informative to the policymaking process. The findings of these 
studies add nuance to the economic complexities that are woven into Maine’s coastal 
communities. Second, we hope this research adds to each study’s respective body of economic 
literature. Specifically, Chapter 2 contributes to the off-farm labor literature by expanding on the 
existing empirical framework to cater to aquaculture in the United States. Chapter 3 contributes 
to the equilibrium sorting literature by highlighting several of the concerns that surround this 
newer modeling technique. In particular, this research empirically demonstrates the sensitivity of 
the model in response to misspecification. Third, we intended for the findings of this thesis to 
contribute to the goals of SEANET by adding to the understanding of the sustainable ecological 
system (SES) framework through which we are trying to understand the challenge that face 
aquaculture in Maine.  
1.3. Thesis outline 
The following chapters will be presented as follows. Chapter 2 presents a study that explores 
off-farm labor decisions of oyster growers in New England. This section uses data collected in a 
2016 survey and focuses on the marginal effects of demographics, business characteristics, 
climate factors, and information sharing. Chapter 3 employs a pure characteristics equilibrium 
sorting model to extend upon work conducted by Evans et al. (2017). This chapter explores the 
impact on communities of nonmarginal changes in aquaculture production across three regions 
of coastal Maine. It also serves to demonstrate some potential challenges facing a class of 
econometric seeking validation within the literature examine the valuation of nonmarket goods. 
Chapter 4 concludes the thesis with broader takeaways and recommended future work that builds 
upon the research presented here. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT IN AQUACULTURE: A CASE STUDY OF NEW 
ENGLAND’S OYSTER GROWERS 
2.1. Introduction 
Aquaculture is the farming of aquatic organisms such as finfish, shellfish, or plants in 
both fresh and marine waters. Globally, aquaculture production has experienced rapid growth 
over the last decade and now matches wild harvest in volume produced (FAO, 2016). Between 
2000 and 2012, aquaculture was the fastest growing food sector in the world, growing at a rate of 
approximately 6.2% annually (FAO, 2014). One need not look past the global production trends 
over the last 20 years to see how important aquaculture is becoming as a source of seafood 
protein (FAO, 2014). In fact, aquaculture has surpassed wild-capture fisheries in volume 
produced and is expected to make up approximately 66% of all seafood production by 2030 
(FAO, 2013). The causes of this exponential growth are two-fold. First, demand for seafood has 
continued to expand as the global population increases. Second, wild-capture fisheries are 
experiencing stagnation in productivity due largely to decades of overfishing which has placed 
many important fisheries on the brink of collapse, or worse, has already caused a collapse (Pauly 
et al, 2002). This combination of growing demand and declining natural supply has placed 
aquaculture at the forefront when considering alternative seafood sources.  
If aquaculture is to continue to grow successfully, it is important that the inhibitions to 
growth are well understood. Aquaculture production is inherently susceptible to all kinds of 
risks, be they environmental, social, or market-based. As a result, growers utilize a variety of 
methods to mitigate their own risk. By analyzing different types of risks and the associated 
hedging strategies, policymakers in areas with expanding aquaculture industries will be better 
prepared to meet the needs of growers and thereby improve the health and sustainability of the 
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industry. Off-farm labor employment of aquaculture growers is one such strategy that needs to 
be explored.  
This study makes multiple contributions to the literature. First, this chapter addresses a 
prominent gap in the literature; off-farm activity in the aquaculture industry has not been studied 
at any length. Second, we develop an analytical framework to assess the off-farm labor supply in 
New England’s oyster market, which would also be applicable to other aquaculture industries. 
Third, empirical analysis demonstrates evidence that a number of factors, including education, 
gender, age, and experience all play an important role in determining off-farm labor activity in 
the oyster industry. Finally, we examine the importance of access to information in off-farm 
labor decisions, which, as far as we know, has yet to be applied to aquaculture.  
There is a robust literature on the topic of off-farm labor in agricultural markets, which 
has also expanded to include wild-capture fisheries (Mohd et al., 1993). Off-farm activities are 
playing an increasingly important role in sustainable development and poverty reduction, 
especially in rural areas (FAO 1998). Farmers have been shown to seek off-farm labor as a 
means to diversify employment and as a result stabilize income (Man and Sadiya, 2009; Schultz, 
1990). However, there is an implicit tradeoff between on-farm and off-farm income as off-farm 
activities take effort away from on-farm activities. This has been shown empirically by Goodwin 
and Mishra (2004) who find a statistically significant inverse relationship between on-farm 
efficiency and off-farm labor supply. Farmers are also assumed to be risk averse, which has been 
confirmed through a number of empirical exercises (Mishra & Goodwin, 1997). While there is a 
sizable body of literature addressing off-farm labor in its traditional context of farming, there is a 
dearth of literature surrounding aquaculture growers’ off-farm labor decisions. Given the 
growing impact and importance of aquaculture in the United States and around the world, we 
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look to develop an analytical framework to understand off-farm labor participation in 
aquaculture industries. 
This study adapts the traditional off-farm model to develop a new framework for 
analyzing off-farm labor across aquaculture markets in the United States. A new framework must 
include elements that are consistent between agriculture and aquaculture as well as elements that 
pervade specifically across aquaculture industries, while also considering regional and local 
market idiosyncrasies. There are several advantages to applying parts of an established structural 
framework to aquaculture’s off farm labor problem, rather than creating a new framework. There 
are common covariates found ubiquitously throughout the literature, whose relationship with the 
off-farm labor decision is well tested such that casual relationships may be inferred from the 
models. Additionally, direction and significance of parameters that are commonly estimated can 
act as an informal check on our adapted framework. The danger lies in the assumption that 
farmers behave the same way and are subject to the same risks as aquaculture growers. We will 
do our best to carefully examine this assumption. Aquaculture growers and agricultural farmers 
in New England both face substantial capital investment barriers, operate in more rural areas on 
seasonal production cycles, and experience high levels of risk due to environmental factors (i.e. 
adverse weather changing climate, and disease). We are also aware of the differences between 
these two markets. Aquaculture markets, particularly in the United States, often cater to higher-
end buyers. Mariculture is spatially constrained to coastal areas and farming is more prevalent in 
the nation’s interior. Most importantly, these industries are regulated differently such that 
farmers have other forms of risk mitigation tools like crop insurance where growers do not and 
may be more reliant on off-farm labor (Beach & Viator, 2008). While these differences may alter 
the level of demand for off-farm labor (farmers in the region may participate less because they 
 
 
6 
have larger palette of risk mitigation strategies), off-farm labor participation may well be partly 
determined by similar factors.  
Using a mixed-mode survey, information is collected on the variables that capture 
exogenous market shocks and demand for off-farm labor. In addition, this study explores the 
impact of information sharing, which has been overlooked when evaluating off-farm labor 
participation decisions. Zero-inflated count models are used to produce parameter estimates. The 
aptly named zero-inflated models are able to evaluate datasets that have excessive observations 
of zeros. Though it is rarely adopted in the off-farm labor literature, it is a suitable tool to analyze 
the quantity of off-farm labor (in hours), which many growers choose not to supply. 
We deploy our analytic framework to analyze the New England oyster market, which is 
an ideal subject of study for understanding off-farm labor mechanisms in aquaculture industries. 
For one, aquaculture in New England is relatively advanced when compared to most other parts 
of the country and the world that are just beginning to develop their own aquaculture industries. 
New England has a long history of growing well-known species like Atlantic salmon as well as a 
number of high-end shellfish like oysters. There are comparatively sound regulatory institutions 
and procedures in the market, and well-established information-sharing networks in place 
between growers and related institutions like professional associations, universities, and private 
research firms. Thus, we expect the results found in this study to apply to many regions that are 
looking to build healthy aquaculture markets. That is, because New England’s oyster market is 
more developed than most aquaculture markets in the U.S., it is likely that growers in our sample 
are better suited to handle risks than the average grower in the country such that the results 
reported in this paper could apply more broadly than if we were to analyze a less developed 
market. This, coupled with the heterogeneity in business size, workforce socio-demographics, 
and climate allows us to gain a richer understanding of what drives variability in off-farm labor 
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participation. Furthermore, the composition and largely rural setting of the industry may also 
allow for a higher degree of generalizability because few aquaculture hotspots are truly urban. In 
short, New England’s oyster industry is a prime subject of study. The methods and findings of 
this paper will be important as aquaculture markets in the United States develop. By assessing 
the motives behind off-farm labor decisions in this market, this work allow policymakers to 
create better-informed policy related to the development of other aquaculture industries. 
We consider heterogeneous composition and sizable economic impact to be two qualities 
that make the New England oyster industry an ideal subject to study. In 2013, there were more 
than 1500 leases, licenses and permits for place-based aquaculture of shellfish in New England. 
These leases were responsible for a production value that was estimated to be between $45 and 
$50 million (Lapointe, 2013). We focus on the states of Maine and Massachusetts where oyster 
aquaculture is primarily based. In 2014, Maine’s aquaculture sector alone generated 
approximately $73.4 million in total economic impact with Eastern oysters accounting for the 
third largest revenue by species, behind Atlantic salmon and blue mussels. Additionally, the 
industry in Maine is responsible for 571 jobs and $25.7 million in labor income (Cole et al., 
2017). In Massachusetts, Augusto and Holmes (2015) reported that the output value of the 
shellfish industry is estimated to be $25.4 million per year, while the industry contributes $45.5 
million after value added considerations. Their study also found the industry in Massachusetts 
was responsible for creating 900 jobs and over $20 million in labor income. Across New 
England, oysters generate the most revenue of all shellfish and are by far the most valuable 
shellfish produced. New England oyster production accounts for a significant portion of the $173 
million dollar oyster industry in the United States (NOAA, 2016).  
What’s more, oyster aquaculture in New England is growing, just like many aquaculture 
industries across the nation. Increasing demand for high quality shellfish has led to favorable 
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market prices, which has encouraged the continued expansion of New England’s oyster market 
over the past decade (Lapointe, 2013). The success of the market has led to new entrants, 
increasing volume produced and number of businesses over the last decade. In Maine, nearly 
50% of oyster growing businesses started their operations in 2012 or later (Cole et al., 2017). It is 
also important to note that the vast majority of businesses that participate in oyster farming in 
New England are small businesses, with annual revenues below $500,000. In Maine, over 80% 
of businesses fall below the $750,000 annual revenue mark and are categorized as “small 
business” by the U.S. Small Business Administration rule (Cole et al. 2017). Similarly, Augusto 
and Holmes (2015) found that 94% of Massachusetts-based shellfish growing businesses took in 
annual revenues at or below $500,000. Because so many of these businesses are small, and there 
can be high seasonal volatility in earnings, many oyster growers may look to stabilize and 
subsidize their on-farm income with off-farm income.  
This study also looks to explain how information sharing among growers and institutions 
impacts participation in off-farm labor, in part because there has been little work done to this 
end. Growers with access to more information may be more able to combat some of the 
environmental risks with which we are concerned because they will privy to the latest and 
greatest growing techniques. One study done by Johny et al. (2017) finds that the presence of 
strong intra-village social networks in Kerala, India can increase the impacts of household 
characteristics like education on off-farm labor participation. Another study conducted by 
VanWey and Vithayathil (2013) finds evidence that farm-level social networks in the Brazilian 
Amazon help facilitate an information-sharing network that increases the ability and reduces the 
risks for farmers who are seeking to participate in off-farm work. We are interested in the 
information and knowledge sharing components that these past studies explored. Rather than 
perform a full network analysis however, we are interested in how the number of contacts within 
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the industry influences off-farm hours worked. This study also differs substantially from the 
settings of past studies in that, so far as we know, it is the first to examine the influence of 
knowledge and information sharing in a developed country with better and more institutionalized 
pathways for communication (Sevilla, 2013; Pratiwi & Suzuki, 2017). 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. We discuss the construction of our analytic 
framework and our choice of economic model, which borrows from the off-farm labor literature 
in agricultural economics. We then discuss the data collection and analysis, followed by 
empirical results. We conclude by highlighting the significant findings of this work, and by 
recommending this paper as a template for empirical analysis of off-farm labor across 
aquaculture industries in the United States. 
2.2. Analytical framework 
It is held that farming families in the U.S. and other developed countries hold multiple 
jobs as a strategy for diversifying income and by extension, lowering income uncertainty 
(Huffman & El-Osta, 1997). The analytic frameworks applied to rural markets have evolved over 
the last several decades. In this chapter, we add additional structure to adapt a conventional off-
farm labor framework (Mishra & Goodwin, 1997) to fit New England’s oyster market. This 
study experiments with both discrete choice and count models to examine the relationship 
between off-farm labor hours per week and a suite of explanatory variables, some of which 
originate in off-farm labor literature and others that are introduced. Off-farm labor studies 
conducted within agricultural markets have found a number of factors that consistently and 
significantly influence off-farm labor decisions. Farm experience, income, farm size, age, 
number of dependents, level of education, health status, and distance to an urban center are a few 
of the right-hand side variables that are typically included to help explain variance in 
participation (Lass & Gempesaw, 1992; Sumner, 1982; Huffman & Lange, 1989; Ma & Mu, 
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2017). Apart from being integral to the model, the inclusion of variables found across agriculture 
off-farm labor studies can add validity to this chapter’s findings if they agree in significance and 
direction. Business experience and size are expected to have an inverse relationship with off-
farm labor participation, while education, number of children, distance to urban area, and age are 
expected to have a positive relationship.  
Models are crafted to be regionally-specific by including local demand-side variables, 
spatially sensitive environmental factors, and state-specific information sharing features. We 
begin by using two classes of multivariate binary response models; the probit and the logit. 
These simple models will help us answer our first research question: what variables influence the 
binary choice of whether or not survey respondents choose to participate in off-farm labor in a 
coastal New England setting. Both models share an underlying form and differ only in the 
assumptions the econometrician makes regarding the distribution of the unknown errors (the 
random utility component). The logit model adopts a type I extreme value distribution of errors 
and its choice probabilities can be represented as: 
Pr($% ≠ 0|)*) = 	 exp	(1)*)1 + exp	(1)*) 
where the right-hand side denotes a logistic cumulative density function (CDF). Alternatively, 
the probit model which adopts a normal distribution of the errors can be seen as: 
Pr($% ≠ 0|)*) = 4 1√2789:;< exp=− (1)*)?2 @ 
where right-hand side is the standard normal CDF. In both cases, $% is the likelihood that oyster 
grower i participates in off-farm labor.  
 While these models provide rudimentary insights into how the independent variables 
influence the binary choice decision, they do not provide information on the magnitude to which 
respondents participate in off-farm labor following their decision to participate. A more colorful 
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understanding of the off-farm labor decision can be painted if we take advantage of the 
considerable and nonbinary variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, a more sophisticated 
econometric model is needed to explore our second research question: what are the factors that 
influence the number of off-farm labor hours worked? 
We consider two count model specifications, the Poisson and the negative binomial, to 
better understand the relative size and significance of the relationship between off-farm labor and 
the factors that drive participation. These models are remarkably similar, differing only in the 
treatment of the dispersion of the data. If the overdispersion parameter (α) is equal to zero, 
meaning the equidispersion assumption of the data holds such that the variance and the mean are 
the same, then the two models are identical. We chose to experiment with both count model 
types for the sake of comparison, despite clear signs overdispersion within the data (the 
unconditional mean divided by the unconditional variance is approximately 25). The Poisson and 
negative binomial model can be loosely expressed as: Pr	(B% |C*, E%) = exp	(α + )%F1 + E%) 
where: 
• G refers to the G-th oyster grower 
• B% is the number of weekly off-farm labor hours performed by individual i 
• )* is a (1 x k) vector of explanatory variable inputs 
• 1 is a (k x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated 
• α is the overdispersion parameter  
• E% is the randomly distributed error 
The standard count models may start to address our second research question, but they 
ignore the excessive level of zero responses in the dependent variable (hours per week spent on 
off-farm labor). This issue is addressed by estimating a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model and 
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the more flexible zero-inflated negative binomial- Type 2 (ZINB) model. The data lends itself to 
these zero-inflated estimations as it contains an excess of zero responses (205 out of 423 
observations), which could cause the standard Poisson or negative binomial regression models to 
predict the dependent variable poorly. A histogram detailing the frequency distribution of off-
farm labor hours per week can be found in Figure A.1. By separating the count data into zero and 
non-zero groups, zero-inflated models may be better suited to predict off-farm labor provided by 
growers. This separation acknowledges that there is more than one process that could cause a 
grower to not participate in off-farm labor. A standard negative binomial or Poisson regression 
would not distinguish between different possible processes. The first group is referred to as the 
“certain zero” group, which is composed of growers who the model predicts would never 
participate in off-farm labor conditioned on the vector of regressors ()*). The second group is 
comprised of growers that could either participate or not participate. A grower’s group is 
determined by a logit model that predicts whether or not that grower would participate in off-
farm labor and a negative binomial model is used to model the second group only (ℎ% > 0). The 
same process applies to the zero-inflated Poisson regression, which differs only in the value of its 
overdispersion parameter. The discrete density function of the ZIP model can be expressed as: 
Pr(B% = ℎ%) = JK% + (1 − K%) LMN(−O%),											ℎ% = 0(1 − K%)LMN(−O%)OP9/ℎ%! ,				ℎ% > 0  
where: 
• O%	is	both	the	conditional	mean	and	conditional	variance	of	the	distribution 
• K% is the zero-inflation probability 
The corresponding logistic link function can be written generally as: 
7% = O%1 + O% 
Much like the ZIP, the ZINB probability function can be expressed as: 
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Pr(B% = ℎ%) = bK% + (1 − K%)(1 + cO%);d/e,																																																		ℎ% = 0(1 − K%) Γ(ℎ% + c;d)g%! Γ(c;d) = c;dc;d + O%@ehi j O%c;d + O%kl9P9 ,				ℎ% > 0  
To determine the preferred model, two tests are run. First, the Vuong test compares the zero-
inflated models to their respective non-inflated models. Then, a likelihood ratio test determines if 
the overdispersion coefficient (c) equals zero. Likelihood ratio tests compare the Poisson model 
to the negative binomial model, and the ZIP to the ZINB. The combined results from these tests 
help us to select the model that best fits the data. We also conduct AIC and BIC test to compare 
parsimonious goodness-of-fit across models. 
2.3. Data 
We collect information of covariates that are often considered in the off-farm labor 
studies (Mishra and Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Mishra 2004; Woldeyohanes et al. 2016; Xie 
et al. 2018) and also covariates that are unique to aquaculture. The regressors are grouped into 
five categories excluding fixed effects: 1) Socio-demographic variables, 2) Business/Production 
variables, 3) Exogenous climate variables, 4) Information-sharing variable, and 5) Demand-side 
variables. To capture variation in businesses, this study considers years of growing experience, 
species diversification, and uses the number of oysters hauled annually to capture size of 
business. Household demographic information including age, education, number of dependents, 
gender, and marital status are also included in model. We use community-level income and 
population density information collected from the 2014 American Community Survey to capture 
the availability of off-farm labor opportunities in a community. Additionally, the distance of 
each grower from a town center with a population of 10,000 or more is calculated in ArcGIS. 
Note that the inclusion of supply-side variables like municipal-level unemployment rates, 
population density, and access to urban amenities are important in controlling for endogeneity in 
off-farm income. Exogenous environmental factors like annual precipitation and water 
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temperature, which capture dynamic climate effects and can have a substantial impact on a 
business’s yield, are also included. Moreover, we include a variable that measures the number of 
information sources a grower uses within the industry. Growers were asked to include up to eight 
in-state industry contacts as part of our survey. They were also asked to include contact 
occupation, the type of information shared, and to rank them in order of importance. This study 
uses the number of contacts reported operates as a proxy for the amount of information a grower 
has access to. Finally, annual fixed-effects variables are used to control for temporal variation 
from year to year, which should account for larger shocks to the market.  
This paper uses primary data collected in a 2016 survey (Scuderi & Chen, 2018). 
Economic analyses of the aquaculture industry often employ surveys to obtain microdata. The 
survey was sent to all aquaculture growers in the New England states. Several growers and 
extension experts were selected in a survey pretest procedure to help inform the design and 
delivery of the survey. Given limited resources, Scuderi and Chen opted for a mixed mode 
approach, where oyster growers in Maine were mailed a paper copy of the survey, growers in 
Massachusetts were both mailed a paper copy of the survey and emailed an electronic copy, and 
growers in New Hampshire were only emailed an electronic copy. Each grower who received a 
paper copy was offered a $1 cash incentive. Two follow-up surveys were sent to growers who 
had not yet responded, and a $20 cash incentive was offered to those who completed the survey 
and returned it. In 2016, there were a total of 530 oyster aquaculture businesses in New England 
according to the leasing records provided by the state governments: 387 in Massachusetts, 126 in 
Maine, and 17 in New Hampshire. The survey was sent to every one of them. The authors had 
172 surveys returned, with a final response rate of approximately 32%. Approximately half (205 
out of 423 observations) of the growers participated in off-farm labor, with a mean participation 
of 15.3 hours per week.  
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 The survey asked for information spanning three years (2013-2015) and a number of 
topic groups including: 
• Production Methods and Species Produced 
• Farming Inputs, Outputs, and Capital Investments 
• Knowledge and Information sources 
• Demographic and Business Information 
Our analyses include data from the production methods, farming inputs and outputs, species 
diversity, aquaculture experience, number of information sources, off-farm labor, and 
demographic information sections.  
 Due to concerns expressed by growers during pretesting, the survey did not collect 
information on income of each grower. Additionally, while the survey captures many supply-side 
variables for off-farm labor, it does not provide us with demand-side information. To address 
these issues, the survey data is subsidized with information from multiple sources including the 
2014 American Community Survey (ACS). We collect data on median income, unemployment, 
and population density at a ZIP code spatial level. This data is matched with each grower’s 
business ZIP code. These measures act as a proxy for supply-side potency; that is, income, 
unemployment, and population density provide the econometrician with a baseline understanding 
of off-farm labor opportunities. Table A.1. shows the summary statistics and descriptions of the 
relevant variables.  
The survey data is further supported with information on annual precipitation and ocean 
surface temperatures to evaluate whether changes in climate would affect grower’s labor supply. 
Precipitation data was gathered from Geographic.org, which holds a catalog of land-based 
weather station data. Data from 78 weather stations across upper New England is collected and 
ArcGIS is used to match each address to the closest weather station to produce an approximation 
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of annual rainfall for each oyster growing area. Water temperature data was collected from 7 
buoys in the Gulf of Maine and around Cape Cod and accessed through NOAA’s National 
Centers for Environmental Information. The same process was used to match oyster-growing 
sites to their respective water temperatures, noting that the effect of climate is being increasingly 
recognized in the off-farm labor supply literature (Uddin et al., 2014; Okonya et al., 2013; 
Ahearn et al., 2006). Annual precipitation is one method that has been used to capture climatic 
variance across farms (Chen & Vuong, 2018; Ahmed & Goodwin 2016). For land-based 
agriculture, temperature anomalies are another climate identifier. So, while water temperature is 
not a variable that appears in traditional off-farm labor literature, it appears here to capture some 
of the same climatic effects in aquaculture. 
2.4. Empirical analysis and discussion 
For each of our economic models; probit, logit, Poisson, negative binomial, zero-inflated 
negative binomial, and zero-inflated Poisson, the model is loosely specified as: m$(nop% = g%) = 	o(1qr%) 
where nop% is the off-farm labor decision (either binary or in hours per week), r% is the set of 
explanatory variables and 1q  denotes the coefficient estimates (see Table A.1. for a complete list 
of regressors). Each model’s results are useful, however the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model is found to be the preferred model in terms of equidispersion and goodness-of-fit. We find 
that results across all models are comparable, with direction and significance changing little 
between them. Additionally, the variables borrowed from agricultural off-farm labor literature 
agree in direction. Grower experience, business size, age, gender, and education all hold the 
expected signs and are statistically significant.  
Results for the logit and probit models can be found in Table A.2. and can be interpreted 
qualitatively by their sign and statistical significance. However, they will not be discussed at 
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length because they do not address the degree to which each explanatory variable influences off-
farm labor decisions.  
In the preferred model, there are significant results in the first four categories of our 
regressors: 1) Socio-demographic variables, 2) Business/Production variables, 3) Exogenous 
climate variables, and 4) an information-sharing variable. Interestingly, the variables relevant to 
the demand of off-farm labor such as population density, distance to an urban center, and 
unemployment rate, do not have a significant impact on participation. Other demand-side 
controls, such as labor force participation rates may want to be considered in future analysis. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model can offer deep insights into how growers 
weight their off-farm labor decisions. Coefficients in the positive finds group represent the 
difference in the log of the count induced by a marginal change in an independent variable. This 
can be interpreted directly as a percentage change in the conditional mean of weekly off-farm 
labor hours supplied, scaled by the variable whose effects are being estimated. These coefficients 
are presented in positive finds section of Table A.3. 
The interpretation of the logit selection is slightly different. Increasing a variable with a 
positive coefficient would raise the likelihood of a grower being selected into the “certain zero” 
group by a factor of the exponent of the coefficient. Likewise, increasing a variable with a 
negative coefficient would lower the likelihood of a grower being selected into the “certain zero” 
group by a factor of the exponent of the coefficient. 
Results for the Poisson, negative binomial, ZIP, and ZINB regressions can also be found 
in Table A.3. There are some substantive differences between the two zero-inflated models 
indicating that the equidispersion assumption may not hold (the overdispersion parameter 
estimate is 0.288). The ZIP model does not correctly account for overdispersed observations and 
as a result, some parameters are identified as significant in the ZIP model but not the ZINB. We 
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use likelihood ratio tests to demonstrate the superiority of the ZINB model over the ZIP model. 
Additionally, Vuong tests examine how appropriate the use of the zero-inflated models is when 
compared to the standard negative binomial and Poisson regressions. In both cases, the results 
are highly significant and thus the zero-inflated models are, unsurprisingly, a better fit (Table 
A.5.). A comparison of AIC and BIC statistics across our models reinforce these results from 
Table A.3. 
The sensitivity of the models is explored in other ways. We experiment with panel fixed-
effects models but found that they were too costly in degrees of freedom. Also, attempts are 
made to address some of the concerns that come with applying zero-inflated models to our off-
farm labor data. In Figure A.1. there are two peaks, one at zero hours and one at approximately 
40 hours weekly. This could suggest the presence of three distinct classes: those who work full-
time on-farm, those who work nearly full-time, and those who only a few hours a week on-farm. 
The same analysis is done on the subset of our data where weekly off-farm labor hours worked 
were 40 or fewer. The results between our full model and partial model are strikingly similar and 
as such, they are not reported in this chapter. Rounding error could also explain the increased 
number of 40-hour responses and is a common problem found in count data. We do not control 
for rounding error in this chapter.  
 Results demonstrate that gender, experience, and education are heavily associated with 
off-farm labor participation. Having decided to take up off-farm income-generating activities, a 
grower who has one additional year of education is expected to participate in 3.38 additional 
hours of off-farm labor per week; a grower who has one additional year of experience is 
expected to participate in 0.69 fewer hours of off-farm labor per week; and a male grower is 
expected to participate in 27.58 additional hours of off-farm labor per week when compared to 
his female counter parts, ceteris paribus. If a grower is married or engaged, they are less likely to 
 
 
19 
participate in off-farm labor all together. However, if they choose to participate (placed into the 
positive finds group) they are not expected to participate any more or less than their unmarried 
counterparts. We uncover a negative relationship between a grower’s experience in oyster 
production and off-farm labor participation. A more experienced a grower is less likely to 
participate in off-farm labor, and even if she does participate, she is expected to participate for 
fewer hours per week. Likewise, growers that produce a larger volume of oysters are less likely 
to participate in off-farm labor, but even if they do participate, they will be expected to 
participate fewer hours per week. Furthermore, warmer water temperatures are found to be 
associated with more off-farm labor participation. Lastly, we find a significant and negative 
relationship between the number of contacts that growers collect information from and off-farm 
labor participation. A grower who is provided information by one additional contact decreases 
off-farm labor participation by approximately 1.71 hours weekly. A complete list of marginal 
effects can be found in Table A.4.  
Interestingly, the number of dependents, which is often considered to be a very important 
covariate in off-farm labor models, has no significant impact on participation in these 
preliminary models. This could be due, in part, to the setting being studied. To iterate, off-farm 
labor models today are typically applied to small farms in developing countries that tend to have 
higher rates of poverty and fertility and lower rates of education. We posit that the low fertility 
rate (the most school-aged children reported in the survey was three) leads to low variation. This, 
paired with the relatively high-end nature of the market may explain the absence of influence 
usually associated with number of dependents.  
 The model unearths other surprising results. Namely, it can be seen that information-
sharing has an inverse effect on off-farm labor compared with past studies in the literature. 
Grower’s with more industry contacts are expected to participate less in off-farm activities, 
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where other studies have found that it increases the likelihood of participation (VanWey & 
Vithayathil, 2013). This could be due in part to differences in approach and variable 
construction. However, it may also be because acquiring knowledge in highly developed markets 
of wealthier countries serve to make farming more lucrative and stable. In poorer countries with 
less developed industries, farmers use information channels to gain knowledge and receive 
opportunities to increase their income through off-farm activities. Additionally, we observe that 
the information-sharing systems in Maine and Massachusetts appear to behave in a similar way. 
When the information-sharing variable is interacted with a state-specific dummy variable, it is 
insignificant. While states have distinct information-sharing networks, we suspect they operate in 
a similar fashion. That is, in the cases of both Maine and Massachusetts, we would expect the 
more connected growers to participate less in off-farm labor. Finally, we see a small but 
statistically significant bump in off-farm labor participation in 2013.   
2.5. Policy discussion and conclusions 
This study investigates the propensity for oyster growers to participate in off-farm labor. 
Off-farm labor is a strategy for limiting risk in an industry that has an underdeveloped set of risk 
mitigation tools. We look to shed light on an import and rapidly growing sector of food 
production –aquaculture – which has been, to this point, unintentionally overlooked in the off-
farm labor literature. Information gathered in a 2016 survey was used to construct variables that 
represent a broad slate of potential decision-making forces. Both supply-side variables, like 
grower demographics and business size, and demand-side variables that influence off-farm work 
availability such as employment opportunities are considered in our analysis. We find off-farm 
labor participation among oyster growers in New England is motivated by a number of diverse 
drivers. This study indicates that grower demographic characteristics are important in explaining 
the off-farm labor decision process, with things like gender, level of education, and age all 
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playing a role. Business and production variables play a part in off-farm labor decisions as well, 
with larger, more experienced growers participating less. Additionally, higher water 
temperatures lead some growers to participate more in off-farm labor which is likely due to 
higher risk and lower relative yields in production when water is relatively warm.  
Perhaps of the most interest, the model demonstrates that having a more sources of 
information within the industry lowers off-farm labor participation. We posit that growers who 
have more connections to one another and to institutions that regulate oyster production are more 
likely to succeed for two possible reasons. The first explanation is that growers who have access 
to more information are better able to adapt to production shocks and are generally more 
efficient in their production. 
A second explanation is that there might be a case where growers who are dependent on 
oyster growing as their primary source of income are more likely to seek out information than 
those who are not. This provides a unique opportunity for future research. Distinguishing 
between those who participate in off-farm labor because they have to versus those who 
participate because they want to will help us refine our policy recommendations. If the goal of 
policy is to make growing a more sustainable business endeavor, then policymakers should work 
to identify those who have no choice but to subsidize their income with off-farm labor, as 
opposed to hobbyists. Hobbyists are those who work primarily off-farm without intention of 
becoming fulltime growers. For this group, minimizing off-farm participation may not be the 
goal as it is not being used as a risk mitigation strategy. There may be a third group of growers 
who participate in off-farm labor still. Commercial fishers and lobster fishers are using 
aquaculture as a way to subsidize their primary income. This is due in part to the volatility of 
several New England fisheries, who are seeing moratoriums or cap and trade policies limit a 
fisher’s ability to work and thus earn a living (MAC, n.d.). Aquaculture is a way for this group to 
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diversify income. This group has a unique relationship with off-farm labor as they may seek out 
more sources of income within the aquaculture industry, but still use commercial fishing or 
lobstering as their primary income. Understanding how knowledge and information effects each 
of these groups differently will provide policymakers with more pointed recommendations with 
which they can design policy. Nevertheless, by broadly identifying the inverse relationship 
between off-farm labor and the amount of information growers have access to, we are confident 
in making general policy recommendations. Namely, by broadening access to information for 
growers who need off-farm labor to earn a living, those growers will be better able to sustain 
themselves within the industry. If policymakers and stakeholders improve information 
dissemination pathways such as industry meetings, regular newsletters on the latest technology 
and growing techniques, or workshops on growing technique, growers who are struggling to 
insulate themselves against downturns in production are adding another risk-hedging strategy to 
their arsenal.  
Overall, the off-farm labor framework is well suited to study oyster aquaculture in New 
England, producing results that are consistent with intuition. While understanding the 
underpinnings of off-farm labor decisions among growers in New England is valuable in and of 
itself, much of the value of this chapter is the empirical structure this chapter contributes to 
understanding aquaculture industries more generally. First, we demonstrate that zero-inflated 
models are suitable for analyzing the off-farm labor phenomenon. Next, we show that the 
consideration of both supply and demand side variables may be important, as well as the 
inclusion of variables that capture the degree to which growers share information. This study can 
serve as a template in applying off-farm labor theory to aquaculture markets across the United 
States at a time when aquaculture is becoming increasingly important as a source of seafood. By 
examining the characteristics that motivate growers to choose to participate in off-farm labor, 
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insights into areas in which policy may apply can be gained. If aquaculture in the United States is 
to continue to grow sustainably, it is critical that policymakers understand what causes growers 
to turn to these key risk-minimizing approaches. To conclude, we hope this chapter can help 
guide stakeholders, including policymakers, businesses and even consumers in developing 
aquaculture industries in an economically sustainable way.  
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CHAPTER 3 
BEYOND MARGINAL IMPACTS: VALUING MAINE’S MARINE AQUACULTURE IN 
A RESIDENTIAL SORTING MODEL 
3.1. Introduction 
Global aquaculture production has experienced rapid growth over the last decade and has 
surpassed wild-capture fisheries in production by volume. This growth is expected to continue as 
global demand for seafood expands while wild-capture fishery production stagnates due to 
changing ocean conditions and rampant overfishing (FAO, 2016). The United States is poised to 
take advantage of this economic opportunity by expanding its aquaculture sector (Evans et al., 
2017; Knapp, 2008; Valderrama & Anderson, 2008; Kite-Powell, Rubino & Morehead, 2013). In 
particular, we note the demand-side potency of the U.S. market. Ranking 16th globally, the 
United States is a relatively minor producer of aquaculture, but is the world’s leading seafood 
importer (NOAA, 2018). The U.S. imports over 80 percent of its seafood and in 2017, imported 
$21.5 billion, which was more than any year prior (NOAA, 2017). To counteract this staggering 
deficit, policymakers in the United States have set lofty expansionary goals for marine 
aquaculture. For example, in 2016 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) established a target of increasing U.S. marine aquaculture production up to 50% by 
2020 (NOAA, 2016). While some of this projected growth is expected to take place in areas 
without established aquaculture industries, it is likely that much of the new production will be 
generated through the expansion of existing industries.  
Maine, which has a long history of aquaculture production and thousands of miles of 
coastline, is one of the places where aquaculture has expanded and where more growth should be 
expected. Maine’s stakeholders and policymakers alike have suggested that growing the state’s 
aquaculture industry could serve as a mechanism to subsidize depleted wild-capture fisheries and 
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to support rural coastal communities that struggle economically (Lapointe, 2013; Knapp & 
Rubino, 2016; Sustainable Ecological Aquaculture Network, 2016). In 2014, Maine’s 
aquaculture industry was estimated to have a direct economic impact of $73.4 million (Cole et 
al., 2017), producing on as little as 0.03 percent of Maine’s public waters (Department of Marine 
Resources (DMR), 2016). This is a marked increase from a similar study conducted in 2007 
which uncovered a direct economic impact of only $30 million (Morse & Pietrack, 2009). 
Maine’s economic and geographic situation make it an ideal candidate for expanding marine 
aquaculture production to satisfy domestic demand-side needs.  
However, the interest that many have in expanding coastal aquaculture has not gone 
unimpeded. Knapp and Rubino (2016) and Evans et al. (2017) highlight how expanding the 
presence of aquaculture production areas disrupts other coastal resource users. By introducing 
new aquaculture production into coastal systems, the relative provision of coastal resources is 
altered, and the resulting redistribution leads to an increase in utility for some resource users and 
decrease in utility for others. Coastal homeowners, recreationists and commercial marine fishers 
are just a few of the parties concerned that the negative externalities created through expanding 
aquaculture will not be counteracted by the positive externalities. Still, compromise may be 
possible. Communities across coastal Maine hold diverse preferences for marine aquaculture. By 
revealing the idiosyncratic preferences held by different communities through the behavior of 
homebuyers, we may be able to identify aquaculture siting possibilities that have a net benefit for 
coastal resource users. 
 To correctly estimate the impacts of a quickly changing seascape on different groups of 
coastal resource users, it is imperative we utilize the correct tools for analysis. Traditional 
methods, such as the hedonic price model may be ineffective when extra-marginal changes are 
considered. In this chapter, we turn to a class of model called the equilibrium sorting model, 
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which combines properties of market equilibrium and assumptions regarding households’ 
locational choices to estimate community-level WTP for changes in coastal aquaculture 
production. This chapter uncovers community-level willingness-to-pay for aquaculture 
production as a means of understanding the heterogeneity in preferences for marine space along 
the coast of Maine.  
 The willingness-to-pay estimates we present in this study are of a different order of 
magnitude than previous studies and are inconsistent with prior expectations. Sensitivity tests 
unearth possible explanations, namely the resources that populate Maine’s coastline may be 
endogenous to one another. Therefore, aquaculture, as it has been defined in this study, may be 
capturing some of the effects of other amenities occupying coastal space. Still, the relative 
sensitivity of communities to changes in the use of that coastal space is determined.  
3.2. Background 
Maine has over 100 aquaculture growers and grower organizations who produce an 
impressive diversity of species across more than 300 leases (Cole et al., 2017). Atlantic salmon, 
oysters, clams, scallops, and sea vegetables like kelp encompass much of what is produced in the 
state. It is important to note however that the majority of Maine’s aquaculture revenue is 
generated by harvesting Atlantic Salmon, which are not examined in this thesis. We focus 
primarily on the growth of shellfish, specifically oysters, clams, scallops. Leases are licensed and 
managed jointly between the Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) and the Maine 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The state offers three possible license choices: 
Standard leases, limited purpose leases (LPAs), and experimental leases. These leases differ 
substantially in the allowances they offer growers (e.g. maximum acreage, lease duration, species 
allowed, and procurement difficulty). Maine is somewhat unique in its licensing and siting 
process. There are no predefined marine growing zones like the ones found in Chesapeake Bay, 
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Maryland (Maryland Natural Resource Code §4-11A-05, 2015), and across other countries like 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan. Instead, there are unique processes growers must go 
through to obtain each of the three lease types. To obtain a standard lease, growers propose lease 
areas to the DMR; the DMR is then charged with holding three highly political lease hearings 
and public comment periods. Coastal landowners are given notice when a proposed standard or 
experimental lease is within 1,000 feet of their property. Non-landowners are notified by 
newspapers and through the DMR website. Interested parties are invited to provide testimony 
which can either support or oppose the proposed lease. Interestingly, testimony is required to be 
objective in nature such that changes in viewscape and the impact on property values are not 
considered in the final licensing decision. The final licensing decision falls to the DMR 
commissioner, who must consider how the proposed lease site may interfere with landowners’ 
land access, shipping lanes, fisher ability to operate, protected or endangered plants and animals, 
or public use within 1,000 feet of government managed beaches, parks, docks, and land (DMR, 
n.d.). 
 The LPA leasing process differs from the process of standard leases detailed above. Note 
that LPAs are responsible for a very small amount of the total aquaculture production area but 
make up most of the recent growth. These leases are small (400 square feet or less) and must be 
renewed on an annual basis. Landowners are only notified if the LPA is within 300ft of their 
property. Additionally, there is no scoping session or public hearing process where the public can 
voice concerns over proposed LPAs. This can introduce additional tensions between aquaculture 
growers and other coastal resource users. Statewide, LPAs occupy only five acres of land. 
However, the inability of homeowners and other coastal resource users to participate in the 
process further muddies the waters. 
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Experimental leases are the third and most uncommon mode of lease. These leases are 
provided on a one-time basis, such that they may not be renewed. Experimental leases may 
operate for one to three years and can be up to ten acres in size. They hold the same 1000 feet 
notification requirement that standard leases do, but the hearing and scoping process is 
dependent on the lease. The scoping session comes at the discretion of the commissioner of the 
DMR, while the public hearing will be initiated if there are more than five comments in the 
public comment period or if the DMR commissioner finds a hearing necessary (MRSA, 2013). 
This unconventional licensing process leads to curious spatial patterns in lease sites. 
Aquaculture leases are distributed along the entire coastline but there is significant clustering in 
certain areas like finfish in the Downeast portion of the state and shellfish in the Damariscotta 
River region which further complicates the relationship between other riparian resource users 
and aquaculture growers. Because of the clustering patterns of lease sites around the state, there 
may be reason to suspect that aquaculture perceptions across each of the three study regions may 
vary significantly from community to community.  
Work has already been done to better understand the relationship between resource users 
and their perceptions of marine aquaculture. Numerous studies have found evidence that conflict 
arises in coastal areas where aquaculture is being introduced (Mazur & Curtis, 2008; Shafer et 
al., 2010; McGinnis & Collins, 2013). Critics of aquaculture development often cite 
environmental impacts, human health implications, and social tensions that arise from the 
introduction of aquaculture as concerns. This research is primarily interested in how aquaculture 
production is perceived by coastal homeowners, we consider social tensions and influence on 
viewscape as the leading mechanisms in generating variation in household preferences. In their 
study, Shafer et al. (2010) find that New Zealand residents who are in close proximity to 
mariculture have higher degrees of sensitivity to development as well as more negative 
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perceptions of aquaculture, despite their recognition of the positive economic effects that are 
associated with said development. While qualitative research exploring resident perceptions of 
aquaculture has been valuable, quantitative analysis is needed as well. Unfortunately, attempts to 
empirically value changes in marine aquaculture production are rare. As such, this research 
builds off research compiled by Evans et al. (2017), where coastal regions were demonstrated 
empirically to have heterogeneity in preferences for aquaculture. The authors examine the 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of coastal homeowners for a marginal expansion of mariculture on 
three coastal regions in Maine: Casco Bay, Penobscot Bay and the Damariscotta River region. 
Utilizing a semiflexible form hedonic pricing model, Evans et al. (2017) unearth distinct regional 
preferences. Specifically, Casco Bay and Penobscot Bay both yield a negative WTP for marginal 
increases in aquaculture production, although the estimates for Casco Bay were statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that, in general, Penobscot Bay views aquaculture as a disamenity. 
Conversely, the Damariscotta River region is found to have a positive and significant WTP. The 
relationship each region has with aquaculture could be used to explain these differing results. 
Casco Bay is the southernmost region in the study area and the urban center of the state. Its 
waterfront has traditionally been used for recreation, fishing, and shipping. Penobscot Bay is the 
northernmost region in the study area and is composed largely of towns with tourist-driven 
economies. Lastly, the Damariscotta region sits between Penobscot and Casco bays, and is 
unique in its dependence on working waterfronts and its history of promoting shellfish 
aquaculture activity. The results found by Evans et al. (2017) are meaningful when considering a 
marginal increase in the space used for aquaculture production. However, policymakers and 
stakeholders are advocating for large-scale, or non-marginal changes to the coastal landscape. In 
this thesis, we consider the problem of large changes in the utilization of coastal space and 
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estimate WTP at a community-level using the correct tool for analysis: the equilibrium sorting 
model.  
3.3. Literature review 
3.3.1. Difficulties in valuing environmental amenities 
Economists have been developing hedonic models, like the one used by Evans et al. 
(2017), to describe willingness-to-pay for a range of products and amenities since Rosen (1974) 
pioneered the technique. By exploiting housing and labor markets in particular, economists are 
able to measure WTP by observing implicit prices across differentiated products. Hedonic 
methods have been particularly popular for those engaging in nonmarket valuation of 
environmental amenities. The hedonic property model emerged as the go-to model for 
environmental economists using revealed preference data and it is now generally accepted that 
housing price differentials are reflective of preferences for an entire slate of environmental goods 
and services (Freeman et al., 1993). Unfortunately, assumptions that underpin hedonic property 
models limit their use as an effective policy tool. The models are effective in producing marginal 
willingness-to-pay (MWTP) estimates in the so-called “first-stage” bid function. However, 
environmental policy frequently involves non-marginal, discrete changes like closing of a mill, 
building a nuclear reactor, or enacting a new air quality policy (Sieg et al, 2004). The “second-
stage” hedonic bid function is capable of producing WTP estimates for these large or discrete 
changes, but in practice this proves to be econometrically taxing and requires using a reduced 
form of the hedonic price function, which makes identification challenging (Freeman et al., 
1993).  
 Additionally, hedonic property models can examine how changes in an environmental 
amenity impact the housing market but have little to say about how it will affect other “goods” 
over which consumers hold preferences (e.g. cost of living, school quality, availability of urban 
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amenities). While a partial equilibrium framework is suitable for assessing impacts around the 
margin, they fail to capture discrete changes, largely because of the ripple effect that large 
environmental changes produce in other markets. It is intuitive then that we utilize a general 
equilibrium framework to account for these intermarket interactions.  
 Equilibrium sorting models have been suggested in response to these shortcomings. 
Sorting theory was born out of Charles Tiebout’s realization that people “vote with their feet” 
(Tiebout, 1956). Tiebout recognized that because there is heterogeneity in household preferences 
for nonmarket goods, there could be migrational effects when an area experiences a discrete 
change in those goods. “Sorting” then is a metaphor for the process of households migrating 
between and settling in communities in accordance with their income and preferences. In other 
words, by observing the movement of households when they are faced with amenity changes, the 
researcher can gain insights into their preferences for those amenities. Within equilibrium sorting 
models, the researcher can observe households that are heterogeneous in both income and 
preferences sorting themselves across communities that differ in both relative cost of housing 
and community-level provisions of environmental, urban, and other locally available public 
goods. Equilibrium sorting models elicit household heterogeneity by estimating parameters for 
preferences based on observed data and using properties of market equilibria. This process is not 
dissimilar from the hedonic and discrete-choice models found in industrial organization (IO) 
literature on differentiated product markets (Kuminoff et al., 2010). Where the hedonic pricing 
approach finds an equilibrium outcome, usually around the margin in a partial equilibrium 
setting, the equilibrium sorting approach instead characterizes the sorting process and finds an 
equilibrium in the general equilibrium setting. A model of sorting can be developed by exploring 
the interactions between household preferences, community costs, and variation in locational 
amenities. Within that model, an equilibrium can be achieved when the demand for housing 
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equals the available supply of housing in each community, and distributions of housing types and 
their prices are determined (Freeman, 2014).  
Additionally, equilibrium sorting models can be an incredibly useful policy tool and have 
traditionally been used in evaluating the impact of environmental effects. By adding structure 
and manufacturing household preference estimates, the econometrician is able to estimate 
community-level WTP for non-marginal changes of an amenity in a general equilibrium 
framework. The theoretical framework of the model has been demonstrated empirically and 
results have been consistent with theory (Smith et al., 2004). 
3.3.2. The pure-characteristics equilibrium sorting model 
Sorting models have fallen into three distinct frameworks: the random utility sorting 
(RU) model, the calibrated sorting (CS) model, and the pure characteristics equilibrium sorting 
(PC) model. We focus on the third. These models vary in their assumptions about the choice 
process, expression of household preferences, and use of instrumental variables in estimation 
(Kuminoff et al., 2013a). RU models and CS models are sometimes called horizontal sorting 
models in line with the industrial organization (IO) literature (Waterson, 1989). Horizontal 
sorting models hold that a household’s preferences for an amenity is horizontally differentiated 
such that there is no implicit rank ordering of quality. This means that for any given amenity, 
households can disagree about which communities are the are the closest substitutes, which leads 
to greater variety of substitution options. RU models define the choice set as the home 
conditioned on the job of the primary earner of the household which recognizes the relationship 
between community choice and workplace, where CS model’s choice set focuses on the tradeoffs 
between school quality and price of housing. Additionally, RU models use the attributes of 
substitute amenities which are calculated as a function of housing characteristics within a 
community and the exogenous amenities within all other communities to create the price-quality 
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instrument. CS models, on the other hand, model the production function of the endogenous 
amenity (Kuminoff et al., 2013a). Table B.1. describes the major differences across the three 
types of sorting models.  
The PC sorting model used in this chapter separates itself from the others primarily in 
that it considers amenities to be vertically differentiated. Vertical sorting models assume all 
households in the model hold preferences over the same amenities and hold the same weight for 
each of those preferences. These assumptions imply that households all agree on a rank ordering 
of communities (Evans, 2011). The PC sorting model is different from the CS and RU primarily 
in its treatment of amenity differentiation. The vertical differentiation of amenities allows 
households to unanimously rank communities by price, which acts as the instrument used to 
address endogeneity between community-specific amenities and households’ community choice.  
All sorting models impose high levels of structure on the data and utilize properties of 
market equilibrium to evaluate discrete changes in environmental and other nonmarket 
amenities. The PC model, developed by Epple and Sieg (1999), PC models are distinct in their 
treatment of agent choice which requires households to make a two-stage decision. First, 
households who hold preferences over a series of amenities must choose the community that 
maximizes their utility given that community’s provision of those location-specific amenities. 
Then, conditional on the community choice, those same households must decide how much 
housing and how much of the private good (numeraire) they wish to consume. The treatment of 
housing within the PC equilibrium sorting model is distinct in that households are asked to 
consume a continuous amount of indexed housing units which are equally priced and 
homogenous (Kuminoff et al., 2013a). Model parameters are estimated using a one-stage 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Parameter estimates are used to simulate a 
large number of households with heterogeneous preferences and income, which can then be used 
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to predict how these households might react to discrete change. In this case, we use real world 
changes in amenities such as school quality, water quality, aquaculture, and others that will be 
described in the data section of this paper. By examining the change in distribution of households 
across the communities, it is relatively straightforward to estimate WTP. While we are interested 
in examining how observed changes in aquaculture and other amenities impact the housing 
market for validation purposes, a proposed strength of the equilibrium sorting model is its ability 
to predict how changes that have not yet been observed in amenities will impact housing 
markets. The remainder of this section details the model’s upfront assumptions and the process 
by which it achieves equilibrium and produces WTP.   
3.4. Theoretical framework 
3.4.1. Model structure 
In this chapter, we will follow their model and notation laid out in the Epple and Sieg’s 
seminal paper (1999). The authors present a description of the model where there is an economy 
that consists of a continuous and finite spatial landscape of households, C, that are heterogeneous 
in their preferences for locally available goods, α, and in their income, y. These households 
reside in a landscape that is broken into J communities with fixed boundaries that need not be 
homogenous in size, shape, or population. These communities differ in price for homogenous 
units of housing Ns and their provision of these locally available goods, ts, known in the 
literature as the “public good”. Take note that the “public good” found in the equilibrium sorting 
literature is quite distinct and separate from the non-rivalrous and non-excludable public goods 
found in microeconomic literature. The public goods in this thesis are instead assumed to be 
community specific and typically include things like urban amenities, school quality, and 
environmental attributes. Now, in this landscape, households hold preferences over ts, but also 
over a housing good, h, and composite of private goods known as the numeraire, n. The 
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numeraire could include things like country clubs, private gyms, or marinas. Households are 
constrained by their income and are assumed to save nothing, spending all remaining income on 
the composite private good. A households’ locational choices are assumed to be jointly 
determined by α and y and their joint distribution, f(α,y), is assumed to be continuous. This 
model assumes that communities differ only in the index set of characteristics that fall within the 
public good.  
Recall the household location decision can be thought of as a two-step process where a 
household must first select the community which offers the preferred level of the public good. 
Conditional on that choice, the household then chooses the amount of housing and numeraire to 
consume. Since it is assumed that households can purchase as much housing as they desire 
(constrained by their income and indirectly by their preferences) at the market price in each 
community, the number of homogeneous housing units a household consumes becomes a 
function of the provision of the public good and the price of a community, as well as the 
household’s preferences and income. A household’s indirect utility can then be seen as: u(c, t, N, g) = v( c, t, ℎ(N, g, c), g − 	N ∗ ℎ(t, N, c, g), c) 
Given this specification, maximizing household utility becomes a matter of selecting the utility 
maximizing community, j, from communities x = 1,… , z conditional on income and community 
price.  x∗ = argmaxx 	{us}s~d  
where x∗ is the community that maximizes household utility and us is the indirect utility a 
household receives from choosing community j. A sorting equilibrium is reached when every 
household is in its preferred community given income and prices where prices are endogenous to 
the household community choice. This is consistent with market clearing conditions that require 
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aggregate demand for housing BÄ to be equal to aggregate supply for housing BÅ in community 
j at price Ns. This can be written as: BsÄÇNsÉ = 	BsÅÇNsÉ 
It may be helpful to consider a simple thought experiment. Imagine there are two communities that 
may differ in their shape, size, and population, as well as in their air quality. The community with 
better air quality (community 1) is more expensive to live in, which implicitly indicates that 
households in both communities agree that that community 1 is the community of higher rank. 
There is an implicit tradeoff between how much housing a household can purchase and the air 
quality of the community they live in. Households who hold stronger preferences over air quality 
will be more willing to sacrifice housing than those who hold weaker preferences. Additionally, 
households with looser income restraints will be more able to afford the pricier community. The 
intuition is that households will sort themselves based on their preferences for air quality and their 
income. As households who hold strong preferences and higher income move to community 1, its 
price will begin to rise. In response, households who hold weak preferences for air quality, or who 
have income restraints that require them to move will migrate to community 2. This process 
continues until no household would be better off by moving. By observing the migration of 
households and the resulting price changes in the communities, it is possible to assess the effect 
that air quality has on utility for each household.  
3.4.2. Model conditions 
PC equilibrium sorting models are highly-structured parametric models. As such, there are 
necessary conditions that are imposed on the model that allow the sorting process to occur. 
Ellickson (1971) was the first to derive restrictions used to induce sorting behavior. Westoff 
(1977) then provided a proof that a sorting equilibrium exists in a model given heterogeneity in 
household income. Westoff’s work was extended by Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) and 
 
 
37 
Epple and Romer (1991) to include market clearing conditions. Epple and Platt (1998) further 
extend the model to account for heterogeneity in income, which led to the current 
characterization of three essential restrictions; stratification, boundary indifference, and 
ascending bundles, which are collectively known as the “single-crossing condition.” The 
following conditions are defined as follows: 
1) Stratification -The stratification condition argues that households will sort themselves 
across communities continuously based on their joint distribution of taste and income. 
This can be represented algebraically as: 
Çgs;dÑcÉ < 	 ÇgsÑcÉ < ÇgsÜdÑcÉ	 and Çcs;dÑgÉ < 	 ÇcsÑgÉ < ÇcsÜdÑgÉ 
That is, conditioned on taste (c), the income (g) of households in community x − 1 will 
be less than that of households in community x, which in turn will be less than the income 
of households in community x + 1 and conditioned on income (g), the tastes of 
households in community x − 1 will be less than that of households in community x, 
which in turn will be less than the taste of households in community x + 1. This 
assumption is critical to the rank ordering of communities by taste and income.  
2) Boundary indifference – Boundary indifference allows there to be households with given 
taste and income that are indifferent between communities j and j+1, which are adjacent 
in relative price. This can be seen algebraically as: 
áÇc, t̅s, Ns, gÉ = 	áÇc, t̅sÜd, NsÜd, gÉ 
It is intuitive that, given a continuous joint distribution of households (c, g) broken into 
discrete communities x = 1,… , z, that there will be some households who fall on the 
boundary between two communities that are adjacent in their rank. This is illustrated in 
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Figure B.1., where âs denotes the boundaries on which households within the continuum 
may fall.  
3)  Ascending Bundles – Ascending bundles states that the structure of the model allows us 
to assume that the relative community price Ns and the relative provision of the public 
good ts move together such that they can understood as synonymous to one another. The 
ascending bundle property is written as: 
gsÜd(c) > gs(c) 	→ 	NsÜd > Ns	ãåç	tsÜd > ts	 
The ascending bundles property allows the researcher to understand community quality, 
which is unobservable, through community price, which is observable.  
Together, these assumptions imply that household indirect utility curves in the price-public good 
space (t, N) are monotonically increasing such that they cross only once. The properties of the 
single-crossing condition are essential to achieving a sorting equilibrium. Epple and Sieg (1999) 
these properties to develop community ranking instruments which are used in identification. The 
households’ interpretation of single-crossing condition can be understood visually from Figure 
B.2. Households a, b, and c are sorted into communities éd,	é?, and éè which are delimited by 
boundaries âd and â?. Community édhas the lowest quality and éè has the highest quality. 
Household a holds the lowest income but still sorts into the community of the highest quality 
because it holds the strongest preferences over the public good. Household c sorts into éd despite 
having the highest income because it holds the weakest preferences over the public good. A 
household’s joint determination of community under the single-crossing condition can be 
understood mathematically as: 
ê(c, t, N, g) = 	 çNsçtsë u	 = 	uí 	= 	−ìu ìts⁄ìu ìNs⁄  
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where ê(c, t, N, g) is monotonically increasing in income conditional on taste (g|c)and taste 
conditional on income (c|g). That is, a households’ indirect utility is a function of the amenities 
provided by the community in which they live and the preferences that that household has over 
those amenities, as well as the price of housing in that community and the income of the 
household. By employing Roy’s identity, ê is conveniently decomposed into a two-piece 
Marshallian demand schedule: 1ℎ(Ns, g) ïìu ìts⁄ìu ìNs⁄ ñ 
where the first piece is the inverse housing demand and the second piece is the Marshallian 
virtual price for the public good. This means that, holding income constant, the price-per-unit of 
housing will be rising strictly in preferences for the public good relative to the private good 
(Kuminoff, 2013a). While the literature has not provided a formal proof of single-crossing 
condition achieving a sorting equilibrium, there have been numerous quantitative validations 
(Epple & Sieg, 1999; Epple et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2004; Kuminoff, 2009; Klaiber & Smith, 
2010; Evans, 2011).  
 It is important to note that while the single-crossing condition is necessary to create a 
sorting equilibrium, it alone is not sufficient to ensure an equilibrium. Because the sorting 
landscape is composed of communities that are characterized by a vector of housing prices and a 
vector capturing the provision of the public good, it is also assumed that a sorting equilibrium 
can only be established once every household is consuming the optimal level of housing h and 
private goods n in optimal community j. To summarize, the single-crossing condition is 
necessary in facilitating a sorting equilibrium and is central to the estimation of the PC 
equilibrium sorting model.  
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3.4.3. Model parametrization and sorting 
PC equilibrium sorting models take a robust theoretical structure and parameterize it, 
resulting in a complex structural equation model which has taken several different forms. The 
original model specification adopted a general Cobb-Douglas functional form (Epple & Platt, 
1998). However, today’s model utilizes the constant elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form, which 
has several useful properties. By adopting the CES structure, the model’s indirect utility equation 
separating it into two distinct parts: 
áÇc, t̅s, Ns, gÉ 	= 	óctò + ïLMN =gd;ô − 11 − ö @ LMN =−1NõÜd − 11 + K @ñòúdò 
where	ρ is a measure of substitution between housing and the provision of the public good, γ is 
income elasticity, ω is price elasticity, and β is a scaling parameter on housing demand. The first 
term (ctò) can be roughly interpreted as the utility provided from the public good. The second 
term in the equation is the utility derived from the contribution of private goods, which depends 
on income and housing.  
The CES structure has useful properties apart from separating the private and public good 
components of the indirect utility function. If ρ < 0, the CES function satisfies the single-
crossing condition. Additionally, the structure of the model allows us to easily derive housing 
demand, which takes a convenient Cobb-Douglas form (by following Roy’s identity): ℎÇNs, gÉ = 1Nsõgô 
The introduction of the necessary conditions bundled within the single-cross condition 
induces sorting by allowing for the separation of household parameters and community 
characteristics, 
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ê(c, g) ≡ ln(c) − ¢=gd;ô − 11 − ö @£§§§§§§•§§§§§§¶ß®©™´¨®≠Æ	Ø¨∞±∞≤≥´±¥™≥¥≤™ 					= lnµ∂sÜd − ∂stsò − tsÜdò ∑£§§§§•§§§§¶			Ø®∏∏©π¥≥∫	Ø¨∞±∞≤≥´±¥™≥¥≤™ ≡ âs ∂s is a community-level provision of private goods that considers community price and the 
degree of substitution between the private and public goods such that: 
∂s = exp−=¢Ç1NsõÜd − 1ÉK + 1 @	∀x = 1,… , z − 1 
As such, âs can be thought of as a community characteristics index that is a function of both 
public goods, tsò, and private goods, ∂s, that occurs at the boundary of communities x and x + 1. 
Notice how the boundary indifference property to is used to build âs, which operates as a cutoff 
mechanism to households as they sort across the landscape. ê(c, g) represents those households 
which are characterized by their taste and income and are indifferent between communities j and 
j+1. Household ê(c, g) is a simulated household whose taste and income parameters are drawn 
from a joint distribution that is developed using observed housing data. In essence, ê(c, g) 
operates as a household preference index.  
 Given community cutoff points, âs, and households ê(c, g), the sorting process becomes 
quite simple. If ê(c, g) > âs, the household will prefer community j+1 over community j. 
Conversely, if ê(c, g) < âs, the household will prefer community j over j+1. Because of the 
ascending bundles property, households with a higher ê(c, g) will prefer communities that offer 
a larger provision of the public good despite the higher cost of housing. The sorting process is 
recursive. The community with the lowest price (j=1), and by extension the lowest provision of 
the public good, is filled first. This is followed by community j=2 and each consecutive 
community up to community J. Each community is filled and markets clear when housing 
demand in each community equals housing supply. Sorting is designed to capture an indifferent 
 
 
42 
household’s tradeoff between consuming more housing and numeraire with a lower provision of 
the public good, and consuming a higher provision of the public good but having to pay more for 
each unit of housing.  
3.4.4. Model estimation 
The empirical model was estimated using MATLAB. We follow the estimation 
procedures developed by Epple and Sieg (1999) and refined by Sieg et al. (2004). Estimation 
relies on a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach that takes advantage of the high 
level of structure built into the model. In their seminal paper, Epple and Sieg propose a two-stage 
estimator to generate point estimates of parameters. In the first stage, the community-level 
income distribution is expressed as a function of parameters that are included in the model’s 
structure. The second stage of estimation relies on simulated moment conditions which are built 
from instrumental variables that are consistent with community price rankings. Essentially, the 
simulated moments are stacked such that there exists a system of equations that is being 
estimated simultaneously. This can be thought of as a series of root problems whose purpose is 
to find the parameters that minimize the distance between the observed and predicted data. The 
parameters estimated by the GMM process, along with observed household data are used to 
model the sorting process from which regional, community, and simulated household WTP can 
be calculated. 
Sieg (2004) propose an alternative one-stage estimator using simulated GMM that is 
employed in this chapter. In addition to income quantiles and the implied public good, housing 
expenditures are also used to formulate moment conditions. Seven moment conditions are 
constructed from housing expenditure quantiles (25th, 50th, 75th), income quantiles (25th, 50th, 
75th), and the implied level of the public good provision. While smaller quantile delineations can 
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be used to improve the precision of the model’s estimations, typically this requires larger 
amounts of data than are available to the researcher.  
The first set of moment conditions that minimize the difference between 25th, 50th, and 
75th predicted and observed log income percentiles can be seen as: ºågsΩ(æ) = ºågsø(æ) = 0 
Superscripts O and P represent observed and predicted log income quantiles, and q represents the 
qth quantile. The second group of moment conditions seek to minimize the difference between 
observed and predicted log housing expenditures. Quantiles are taken by aggregating housing 
expenditures at the community-level and determining the cost per unit price. Using the housing 
demand equation (ℎÇNs, gÉ = 1Nsõgô) and information on the normalized prices for housing in 
each community, we derive the stack of moment conditions: ºå¿sΩ(æ) − ln(1) − (K + 1)ºåNs − öºågsø(æ) = 0 
The final moment condition, a linear approximation of the provision of the public good, 
can be seen as: t¡s − ¬rs = Es 
Here, rs indicates the community-specific attributes that are observable to both the household 
and the econometrician, and Es designates those community-specific attributes that are 
observable to the household but not the econometrician. It is assumed that Es does not impact that 
rank ordering of communities and that it does not vary systematically with rs. This is a critical 
assumption, as the econometrician cannot observe the entire public good. Within the model, t¡s is 
a function that outlines the recursive algorithm used in the sorting process. Each community’s 
public good is, in part, a function of the previous community’s public good, leaving td as a 
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parameter within the model. t¡s is approximated using community cutoff points, âs, and 
structural parameters, such that: 
t¡s = √t¡dò −ƒ(∂% − ∂%;d)exp	(−â%;d)s%~? ≈
dò ∀	x = 2,… , z 
This study follows the methods of Kuminoff (2009) to construct the instruments 
necessary for exogenous sorting. Given that community price and community quality move 
together as per the ascending bundles property, Kuminoff recommends using Chebychev 
polynomial functions on community price rankings to generate instrumental variables. 
Instruments are needed in estimation because of the potential for correlation between 
community-level fixed-effects, and equilibrium prices and the public good. This implies that 
unobserved amenities do not systematically influence the sorting process. That is, the unobserved 
component of the public good may affect the level of income in each community, it must not 
change the rank ordering of communities by income. This highlights the importance of capturing 
the major forces that influence locational decisions within the public good. While the entire 
public good cannot be directly observed, by observing household locational choices, community 
prices and amenities, and population shares, the implicit public good can be measured.  
3.4.5. Willingness-to-pay estimation 
The PC equilibrium sorting model is capable of producing general equilibrium Hicksian 
WTP estimates given multiple and simultaneous changes to the community-level goods in the 
model. One of the advantages of using equilibrium sorting methods over other partial 
equilibrium methods is that households are able to make new locational choices given a large 
change in their environment. Hicksian WTP in a partial equilibrium context would be defined as: áÇc, t¡s, Ns, g −∆«mø»É = 	áÇc, ts, Ns, gÉ 
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, which clearly limits the choice of the household to community j given the change in public 
good from ts to t¡s. The general equilibrium framework of the PC equilibrium sorting models 
includes no such restriction. Households are able to respond to changes in locally available 
goods over which they hold preferences such that: á(c, t¡…, N¡…, g −∆«m ») = 	áÇc, ts, Ns, gÉ 
Here, À denotes the household’s new community choice, and t¡…and N¡… are the corresponding 
levels of the new community’s public good and price. Willingness-to-pay of each simulated 
household is estimated, and can then be aggregated at a community-level by mean, median, or 
other moments of interests.  
3.4.6. The counterfactual equilibria 
In order to calculate WTP for a discrete change in an amenity, a counterfactual 
equilibrium must be computed. Equilibrium sorting models are distinct in their ability to estimate 
the WTP for any number of counterfactual equilibria. First, estimated parameters are applied to 
our observed data to generate a baseline landscape of simulated households. From here, the 
impact of a counterfactual change in any or all of the public goods is computed. Again, we 
follow the methods laid out by Sieg et al. (2004). First, a large number of households are 
simulated by being drawn randomly from the distribution, f(α,y). These simulated households are 
sorted across communities given the observed levels of community prices, the various public 
goods, and population shares. Housing supply is the mechanism through which the model can 
close, such that sorting is complete once housing demand is equal to housing supply in each 
community. The housing supply function is written by Sieg et al. (2004) as: BsÅ = ºsNsÃ 
where ºs is a community-specific constant controlling for size and other fixed components, and τ 
is the constant supply elasticity. Kuminoff et al. (2013) acknowledge that housing supply is 
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typically held as constant or calibrated using constant supply elasticity, but more work needs to 
be done to characterize the supply-side within equilibrium sorting models.  
Given changes to the level of the public good offered by the community to each of the 
simulated households, new equilibrium prices can be computed. To do so, a system of nonlinear 
equations given by the market-clearing conditions for each community x = 1,… , z	must be 
solved. The process starts with an initial guess at the price of the lowest price-ranked 
community, and community housing markets clear sequentially following the sorting process 
outlined earlier, ending with the highest price-ranked community z − 1. The initial guess is 
adjusted, and the process repeated until the Jth market clears.  
3.5. Limitations of the empirical model 
The equilibrium sorting approach circumvents a number of critical issues within the 
hedonic literature and makes several important improvements on other nonmarket valuation 
techniques, but it too has limitations. Limitations come in many forms and can stem from the 
data entering the model, the choices the researcher has to make in specifying the model, or be a 
product of the model itself. These models impose high levels of structure based on assumptions 
that are built into the model and assumptions made by the researcher. As such, model validation 
and sensitivity tests are imperative to widening the acceptance of these models (Keane, 2010; 
Kuminoff et al., 2013b). There have been efforts to validate sorting models, including an 
unpublished dissertation (Evans, 2011) which conducted both an inside and an outside sample 
validation of the model, but more work needs to be done.  
This section aims to call attention to some of the challenges that face the equilibrium 
sorting models and make suggestions for improvements. For instance, the PC equilibrium sorting 
framework requires that households unanimously agree upon the ranking of communities by 
their provision of locally available amenities. It is reasonable and prudent to assume that 
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households do not in fact behave this way. While efforts have been made to relax this 
assumption (Epple, Peress, & Sieg, 2010), it remains a vulnerability of the model.  
 A second important limitation to this model lies in the assumption that the community’s 
initial provision of the public good is exogenous to choices made by home buyers. That is, when 
a household chooses a community, the level of each component of public good is unaffected by 
the migration of the household to that community. In reality, it is reasonable to expect a level of 
endogeneity between a household’s community choice and the level of public goods provided by 
that community since it is the households within the community that make decisions on the 
provision of certain public goods. However, some goods are more endogenous than others, such 
as open space and school quality (Kuminoff et al., 2013). This issue may be unavoidable in this 
paper. The model requires us to assume that changes in the landscape between the baseline and 
counterfactual scenarios are caused by exogenous shocks. However, household participation in 
the aquaculture leasing process is inherently endogenous to the changes in the amenity.  
 A third and highly concerning component of any econometric endeavor is omitted 
variable bias (OVB). PC models are particularly susceptible to OVB because they lack an 
intercept and error term. In the model, the public good defines the entire universe of goods and 
services over which households hold preferences. By either including an amenity in the public 
good that in reality is not a part of the household choice, or by omitting an amenity that is a part 
of the household choice, the entire sorting process may be altered. Where other models, like a 
hedonic, may simply overestimate or underestimate the impact of a variable has explaining the 
variation in price and expand their random error term, PC models are fundamentally changing 
the process through which we attain an equilibrium. The effects of the omitted variable are 
absorbed by other components of the public good such that WTP may be hugely inflated.   
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 A fourth limitation of PC equilibrium sorting models in general is that they allow for 
frictionless or costless movement when the landscape experiences an exogenous shock. In other 
words, every household has an equal ability to move. This can lead to an overestimation the 
migration of households in their response, which is a problem the models in this paper 
experience. In reality, we expect there to be a relatively high cost of moving. Households derive 
utility from unobservable, and in some cases intangible goods that never enter our model. Things 
like attachment to a house, neighborhood relations, and access to idiosyncratic amenities that fall 
outside the scope of the public good all play a role in the real-world household choice. A cost of 
movement is one way of approximating the effects of these unobservable factors. To this end, 
efforts have been made. Kuminoff (2009) demonstrates how assumptions underlying costless 
movement influence welfare measures. Ferreira (2010) and Epple, Romano and Sieg (2012) 
include moving costs in their estimates and find that its inclusion has a significant impact on 
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) estimates.  
A final limitation is the model’s sensitivity to the definition of the community. The 
community is the smallest unit of analysis in the model, but more importantly the community 
decision has consequences on both the sorting process and the initial parameter estimates 
(Kuminoff, 2009). We use elementary school districts, a popular choice in equilibrium sorting 
literature, as our unit of analysis. School districts are often chosen because school quality is an 
important element in informing the household locational choice. However, this leaves the model 
vulnerable to estimation error because much of the data that make up the public good, housing 
prices, and income levels are collected at municipal, census tract, and other special levels. Thus, 
when the data is interpolated to the desired spatial unit, extra degrees of measurement error are 
introduced. While the PC equilibrium sorting model is the correct tool for analysis, it is 
important to be aware of these limitations, particularly when considering policy implications. 
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3.6. Data  
3.6.1. Housing data 
As with other revealed preference approaches, equilibrium sorting models require large 
amounts of data in order to produce reasonable estimates and accurate predictions. This section 
will describe the data collection and manipulation process used to generate WTP. Table B.5. 
describes the summary statistics for all of the model’s inputs.  
We collect two primary datasets. The first dataset is comprised of transactions for single-
family homes sold in Maine between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2014. This data 
thoroughly details household characteristics as well as transaction price and date. This data was 
provided by the Maine Multiple Listing Service (MMLS), a private organization that provides 
information to realtors. Addresses were geocoded by the authors of Evans. et al (2017) by 
matching them to road files accessed through the Maine Office of GIS via the automatic match 
function. The addresses that remained unmatched were assigned locations manually using a best 
guess approximation via Google Maps. Taking the data geocoded by Evans et. al (2017), we 
conduct our own extensive cleaning. First, each home’s structural characteristics and price are 
flagged for any obvious outliers (e.g. 100,000 square feet) or obvious errors (e.g. zero bedrooms 
or bathrooms). Next, all characteristics of each flagged home are cross-checked with publicly 
available data supplied by Zillow and Realtor.com. Observations that contained errors and could 
not be validated were dropped from our sample. Our final samples consisted of 6,112, 2,316, and 
1,678 observations for the Casco Bay, Damariscotta River, and Penobscot Bay regions 
respectively. This data is used to generate community prices. 
3.6.2. The first-stage hedonic 
The aptly dubbed first-stage hedonic was originally proposed by Sieg et al. (2002) as a 
means of generating community prices. A hedonic fixed effects model allows us to generate an 
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index of community prices (and quality) which is continuous in nature. The prices are indicative 
of differences in the provision of the public good across communities, as the hedonic price 
function serves to homogenize housing units within the model. The hedonic function is seen as: lnÇ$%sÉ = 	1FÕ%sŒ +ƒ œsé%ss +ƒ œŒ–%Œ + E%sŒŒ  
where Õ%sŒ captures the structural characteristics of household i in community j, that is sold in 
year t. é%s captures the community fixed effects and –%Œ captures time fixed effects. The estimated 
parameter	œs provides the community price indices. Note that $%s is the renter’s price, not a 
homeowner price of the household. This implies that gains from changes in home price are not 
given to the occupant of the household, but rather some other absent landlord entity. Typically, 
rental prices are derived interest rates on home loans and local property tax rates, as well as 
artificial maintenance rates, risk preferences, and depreciation of the home. We use a calibrating 
coefficient borrowed from Evans (2011) to generate renter prices, multiplying each household 
price by 0.136. We follow Evans (2011) because the author uses methods outlined by Porterba 
(1992) to calculate imputed rents (which are equivalent to annual housing expenditures), and 
because the resulting housing expenditure scalar is one of the most recent reported in the sorting 
literature. A complete list of dependent variables can be found in Table B.2. Additionally, results 
from the hedonic regressions can be found in Table B.3. Most of the parameter estimates carry 
the expected sign and are significant.  
3.6.3. Income data 
Recall that households are constrained by income within the sorting process. Income data 
is gathered from the American Community Survey (ACS) at the Census tract-level and then 
interpolated up to the school district spatial level. This process will be described in detail in the 
Spatial interpolation section of this chapter. It should be noted that the ACS reports income in a 
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discrete fashion. It provides 10 bins in across which households are distributed. Using the 
proportion of households found in each bin, a distribution is created from which we draw the 
25th, 50th and 75th quantiles that are used in parameter estimation.  
3.6.4. Public good data 
The second dataset consist of spatial and site characteristic information on aquaculture 
produced and leases issued between 1996 and 2017. This data was provided by the Maine 
Department of Marine Resources (DMR). The GIS shapefile was provided by the Maine office 
of GIS. Data on leaseholder characteristics, lease type, lease approval and termination, acreage, 
species farmed, DMR notes, body of water occupied, and the corresponding GIS polygon of the 
lease are all included. Leases that expire before 2011 are dropped from the dataset.  
These data are supplemented with information from a variety of different sources. The 
ACS provided Census tract-level information on high school graduation rates and population, 
while information on location of hospitals and libraries is gathered from the Maine Office of 
GIS. Each is coded as a point file in ArcGIS. Additional data on per pupil expenditures and 
school choice is collected from the Maine Department of Education (Maine Department of 
Education n.d.). School choice, also known as the Town Tuitioning Program is a curious process 
in Maine where certain municipalities are able to send their children to any school district they 
choose because that municipality does not have a school of its own. Lastly, we collect data from 
the Maine DMR regarding closures of shellfish harvesting areas. The National Shellfish 
Sanitation Program (NSSP) is tasked with classifying shellfish growing areas into four distinct 
categories: prohibited, restricted, conditionally restricted, conditionally approved, and approved. 
A prohibited classification bans any harvesting of aquaculture for any purpose; a restricted 
classification bars the sale of shellfish directly to market for consumption and requires 
depuration; a conditionally restricted classification has similar implications to the restricted 
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classification but can be loosened under certain management plans; a conditionally approved 
indicates that the growing area meets the necessary benchmarks for shellfish distribution except 
under certain management plans; and an approved classification indicates that shellfish harvests 
for direct market sale is allowed. Each closure is given its own polygon in a GIS shape file. 
Growing areas are able to change for each NSSP determination, and there is no set time for how 
long a classification can persist (FDA, 2017). We use the subset of this data containing the 
prohibited and the restricted classifications. These designate long-term shoreline closures and act 
as a proxy for water quality. Collectively, this data is meant to capture the amenities that are 
important coastal homeowners in their household location decision.  
3.6.5. Spatial interpolation 
Much of the data used in estimation is gathered at the Census tract level from the ACS. 
To translate this data into meaningful information at the school district level, it must be 
interpolated by using spatial weights. Spatial weights are taken from the Missouri Census Data 
Center, which constructs the weights by simultaneously considering the land area, the population 
density, and the density of housing units in both spatial units. Continuous data uses weights that 
represent the proportion of the school district that contains the Census tract. For each school 
district, the weights should sum to one. A different interpolation technique is required for school 
district level discrete data like libraries and hospitals. In these cases, the weights should reflect 
the proportion of the Census tract that makes up the school district. To illustrate this, imagine a 
school district that is entirely comprised of two Census tracts where 75% of the district’s 
population is in one Census tract and 25% lives in the other. The tract with 75% of the 
population has 40% seasonal homes and two libraries, the other has 20% seasonal homes and one 
library. To calculate the school district’s continuous percentage of seasonal homes, we use the 
population shares of the Census tracts that make up the school districts as weights, such that 
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(m—N“ℎã$L”‘’÷Œd ∗ %ÕLã“—åãº) + (m—N“ℎã$L”‘’÷Œ? ∗ %ÕLã“—åãº) = (. 75 ∗ .4) +(. 25 ∗ .2) =.35 or 35% Seasonal homes at the school district level 
Now, to interpolate the discrete number of libraries from the census tract to the school district 
level, we use the proportion of the Census tract that falls within the school district 
(m—N“ℎã$LÅÄ), such that (m—N“ℎã$LÅÄd ∗ #—›pGfi$ã$GL“) + (m—N“ℎã$LÅÄ? ∗ #—›pGfiã$GL“) = (1.00 ∗ 2) +(1.00 ∗ 1) = 3 Libraries at the school district level 
 The GIS intersect function is used to map each point onto its respective school district for 
discrete data. This same process is used to determine the school district in which each home sale 
falls.  
 A different process still is used to assign aquaculture production sites and NSSP closure 
areas to their appropriate school districts. Using the buffer function, we create a one-mile buffer 
around a polyline that follows Maine’s average highwater mark. This new shape is then 
intersected with a municipalities polygon file that extends well beyond the one-mile bound that is 
set. Using the calculate geometry features within ArcMap, two new columns are added: a column 
that represents the proportion of municipal water space within the buffer that is occupied by 
shellfish closure areas, and a column that measures the proportion of water space within the 
buffer that is occupied by an aquaculture lease.  
3.6.6. The public good 
As discussed previously, the term “public good” in the context of equilibrium sorting 
literature can be thought of as a community-specific or locally available good or service over 
which households hold preferences. These goods are nonmarket in their nature. The construction 
of the public good must be done with great care. The choice of goods to include in the public 
good are of critical importance to producing accurate estimates because the household locational 
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choice is assumed to be dependent entirely on those goods and community price. For our model, 
we look to the literature for choices that are conventionally included.  
3.6.6.1 School quality measures 
There are several amenities within the public good that are ubiquitous throughout the 
literature. Things like school quality (Bayer et al., 2004a; Bayer et al., 2004b), air quality (Sieg et 
al. 2004; Tra 2010) and access to urban amenities (Kuminoff et al., 2013; Epple & Ferreyra 
2008) are popular choices. In this thesis, school quality is captured by the total expenditures a 
school district spends on each of its students. While school quality is often measured by reported 
standardized test scores, the availability of the needed data in Maine is limited. Instead, we 
assume that school districts that spend more money on each student are more likely to produce 
higher gains on education.  
School choice is also considered, not necessarily as an element of school quality, but 
instead as an independent amenity. School choice provides flexibility to the parents who own 
households in communities where it is offered by allowing them to send their child to any school 
they choose. The voucher program that makes this possible ensures no additional cost to the 
parent, making it an exceptionally appealing program. School choice enters the public good as a 
dummy variable indicating that a school district either provides or does not provide a choice. 
School districts that provide school choice tend to map directly onto single municipalities such 
that they are one in the same. This allows for the binary choice.  
Besides income, other measures of general community quality are included in the public good. 
High school graduation rates are used as a way to measure affluence of any given community. 
While high school graduation rates are not common in the sorting literature, we include them 
here as a means of subsidizing our measure school quality, per pupil expenditures. Together they 
create a compelling proxy for school quality in lieu of standardized test scores.  
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3.6.6.2. Access to urban amenities 
Measures of access to urban amenities are included throughout much of the sorting 
literature. This research is placed at a curious crossroads in that it is one of only a few studies to 
employ a PC model in a strictly non-urban setting. As such, a certain amount of creativity is 
necessary when constructing the urban variable. Popular choices for urban amenities include the 
presence of libraries, hospitals, shopping malls, and public parks. For the latter two, there is an 
absence of variation across each of the regions of study. We calculate two urban variables that 
become a part of the public good index. The first is a simple measure of the number of libraries 
within a school district. This is a rudimentary tool and has several shortcomings. First and 
foremost, a simple count of libraries does not account for population distributions across school 
districts. For example, it is possible to have two school districts where the first has more 
libraries, but the bulk of the population is farther from those libraries because of the way 
households are distributed across the school district. The second school district could have fewer 
libraries, but households are more consolidated around them, and thus the access to these 
amenities may be greater in the district with a smaller count. 
 A second urban variable is introduced to capture the sometimes-odd spatial distribution 
of households around urban amenities in coastal Maine. We calculate the median distance of 
every household in a school district to a hospital. A hospital can be Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 with 
the majority of hospitals in Maine being small, or Tier 3 hospitals. The median distance is 
calculated, instead of mean distance, to avoid the strong effects of outliers.  
3.6.6.3. Coastal amenities 
 One of the more difficult aspects of this research is determining how marine amenities 
influence the choices made by terrestrial households. Maine’s coastal communities are 
comprised of complex networks of resources and resource users. The interactions and 
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relationships between these different resources can be challenging to tease apart, but 
understanding the dynamics is imperative to creating a clear picture of the effects of each 
resource component. Take for example the relationship between aquaculture and commercial 
fishing. Commercial fishing is a big industry in Maine, with production value estimated at 
approximately $637 million in 2018 (DMR, 2019). The production of aquaculture relies heavily 
on the infrastructure provided by the commercial fishing sector, such that it is difficult to tease 
out the impact that changes in aquaculture could have on coastal housing markets without 
simultaneously considering commercial fishing. We include three variables in the public good 
that account for these marine resources: a measure of working waterfront, a measure of water 
quality, and a measure of aquaculture production.  
 To assess how each community’s coastal space is being used, we create a measure by 
determining the percentage of seasonal homes in each community. The intuition is that 
communities with high levels of seasonal homes have tourist-driven economies. In turn, 
communities with more tourist driven economies are likely to have coastal space distributed 
differently than those communities who do not depend on tourism. Maine’s coastline can have 
drastically different degrees of tourist activity even in spatially adjacent communities. 
Water quality is calculated directly from the proportion of NSSP classified shellfish 
harvest closures. While it is tempting to utilize a more obvious measure of water quality like 
turbidity, chlorophyll levels, or salinity, these measures are not salient to households. The NSSP 
classification process requires physical closures of coastline until the water quality is deemed 
safe through a comprehensive review process (FDA, 2017). Coastline closures are readily 
apparent to homebuyers. Only long-term closures are counted because short-term closures that 
appear in conditionally approved and conditionally restricted classifications will often not be 
observed by the households. There are other advantages to using NSSP classifications. Because 
 
 
57 
NSSP closures explicitly prohibit the harvesting of shellfish, the presence of long-term closures 
is endogenous to aquaculture site selection, as the two are mutually exclusive.   
3.6.6.4. Aquaculture 
The final component of the public good may be the hardest to define and accurately 
capture. Aquaculture siting locations in Maine take up relatively little marine space but are 
subject to intense regulatory and public scrutiny. The idiosyncratic nature of the leasing process 
coupled with the heterogenous nature of preferences among Maine’s coastal residents has led to 
a complicated and spatially interesting landscape with regards to both the clustering of 
aquaculture across the state and the perceptions of coastal homeowners who inhabit those areas. 
Furthermore, the spatial-temporal volatility of aquaculture makes it exceedingly difficult to 
accurately capture marginal, let alone nonmarginal effects. In this section, we detail our method 
of constructing a variable that adequately captures the influence of aquaculture on coastal 
homeowners.  
Recall that the goal is to assess the nonmarginal impacts of aquaculture change on a 
community level. As such, the spatial relationships between all households in a given community 
and the aquaculture that is believed to influence homeowners buying decisions must be 
simultaneously considered. We explored two alternative specifications for aquaculture. For the 
first specification, several important assumptions about aquaculture and its relationship to a 
community need to be made. First, we acknowledged that it is possible that there is a size-
distance ratio at which aquaculture will cease to influence a community. For this specification of 
aquaculture, the decay effect is modeled as a spatial weight which takes a tri-cube form. This 
implicitly assumes that larger amounts of aquaculture production close to a community has a 
strong effect that tapers quickly and then levels off as distance becomes large or production area 
becomes small, and can be seen as: 
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‡Ççs…É = (1 − Ççs… æ%⁄ Éè)è ∗ ·(çs… < æ%) 
where j is the relevant community, k is the aquaculture associated with that community, æ% is a 
distance unit, and I is an indicator function. æ% is set to one mile, following Evans et al. (2017). 
When çs… < æ%, ·(∙) = 1 and when çs… > æ%, ·(∙) = 0. 
Second, we assume that the leasing process described in the background section is 
strongly related to the preferences held by households at a municipal level. That is, because 
leasing decisions are ultimately made on a town-by-town basis, households only hold 
preferences over aquaculture leases that fall within the bounds of their municipal waters.  
Our third assumption relates directly to how the distance from a community to 
aquaculture is measured. Municipal population centers are generated by identifying the 
household that minimizes overall distance to each of the home sale locations in our data. While it 
may seem intuitive to measure the distance from a point on a community’s coastline or a 
community centroid, it does not accurately capture how the households are distributed across a 
community, and by extension, how each of those households will be affected by changes in 
aquaculture. By identifying the median of housing sale points in our data for each municipality, 
we are effectively creating proxy for a downtown area where the distance from point to each 
aquaculture siting location within municipal waters is calculated.  
Fourth, we assume that household preferences over aquaculture are not dictated simply 
by the spatially weighted number of acres occupied in each municipality, but rather by a ratio of 
acres used for aquaculture production and the total number of acres available in municipal 
waters. Ultimately, aquaculture enters into the model as a constrained distance-weighted ratio of 
aquaculture acreage to available space. This can be written as: „∂s = ƒ ‡Ççs…É ∗ ãs… «s⁄…∈ÂÊ  
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where „s is the set of all aquaculture leases, ãs… is the acreage used to produce aquaculture in 
community x, and «s is the total amount of available water space.  
Finally, we assume that the differences in the leasing process between LPAs, standard 
leases, and experimental leases yield differences in household preference. That is, because 
households are able to participate in the process of a grower acquiring a standard lease, those 
households value the presence of that lease differently than they would an LPA, where they have 
no input in the leasing process. We estimate two models: one where aquaculture lease types are 
homogenous in their impact on coastal homeowners, and a second where households can hold 
different preferences over different types of aquaculture leases. Broadly, this implies that 
households not only value how much relative aquaculture is in their community and how far 
away from them it is, but that they also value having input into the leasing process.  
The second specification of aquaculture is much simpler but may capture the most 
important aspects from the perspective the home buyer. Instead of constructing a list of 
assumptions to which the index must adhere, the relationship between the community’s 
preferences and the amount of aquaculture production space hinges solely on the total available 
coastline to that community, and the total amount of area dedicated to aquaculture production 
within one mile of the coastline. Ultimately, it is this specification that is used. By including a 
variable that measures the total coastline available, we directly control for the coastal space 
available in each community. As such, measuring aquaculture directly by acreage will allow for 
easy marginal interpretation and also capture the effects of production proportionally to the 
coastline available to each community, much like a single aquaculture density variable would.  
Maine is a challenging place to employ a PC model because of its rural nature and its 
curious treatment of school districts. This is why amenities that are so often included are omitted 
in this chapter. For example, air quality appears frequently throughout the sorting literature, but 
 
 
60 
in Maine it is almost completely homogenous. A lack of variation stymies the use of other 
variables that otherwise would’ve been included. Demographic variables like race also do not 
vary in Maine, as it is one of the oldest and whitest state in the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
The amenities that are a part of the pubic good we consider to be integral to correctly 
characterizing the sorting process. There is always the temptation to include more sources of 
variation across communities, but equilibrium sorting models rely on parsimony to produce 
accurate predictions.  
3.6.4. Counterfactual data 
PC models require further validation if they are to be more widely accepted as a tool that 
can be used for providing policy recommendations (Evans, 2011; Kuminoff et al., 2010). In 
practice however, it can be challenging to validate model predictions against observed outcomes. 
In this chapter, we use data collected between 2012 and 2014 to construct our baseline scenario 
and generate parameter estimates. Data was collected across 2015 and 2016 to generate the 
observed counterfactual. For most model inputs, data was collected from the same source and 
interpolated in the same way. The main exception was that of housing expenditures. Because 
housing transactions data is only available between 2012 and 2014, we collect binned housing 
expenditures data from the ACS, which is made to be continuous by following the same process 
used to create income quantiles. Once counterfactual data is collected, it is possible to conduct 
validation exercises. However, none are conducted in this thesis. 
3.7. Results and Discussion 
3.7.1. Estimation results 
While all models found ¢ < 0, indicating that the single-crossing condition was satisfied, 
the models for each of the three regions produced results that were not in line with expectations. 
As such, two sets of results are reported. Within each set, a general and partial WTP is reported 
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for each region. The first set of results, coming from what will be referred to as the 
unconstrained models, estimate all of the parameters used to produce WTP estimates (See Table 
B.6.). Willingness-to-pay estimated by the unconstrained models is negative for Casco Bay, 
Damariscotta River region, and Penobscot Bay in both the partial and general equilibrium 
setting. However, the general equilibrium results suggest that the mean household WTP 
approaches infinity. The partial equilibrium WTP are finite but again, they do not match our 
expectations by an order of magnitude. At first blush, the model appears to be unbounded by 
income. However, WTP should only be bounded by income if it is positive. If the WTP is 
negative, it can be thought of as a willingness-to-accept (WTA), which is intuitively unbounded. 
The seconds set of WTP estimates is constrained in several of its parameters (See Table 
B.7). We calibrate the parameters for constant price (K) and income elasticities (ö), as well as 
the CES substitution (¢) parameter. Parameter estimates used to calibrate the constrained models 
were borrowed from Sieg et al. (2004) and Evans (2011) and can be found in Table B.4. 
Complete tables of parameter estimates from both the unconstrained and constrained models can 
be found in Tables B.6. and B.7. respectively. Since the constrained models use parameters that 
are not generated directly from the data, the resulting WTP estimates should not be regarded 
truly as estimates. Instead, constrained estimates operate as part of a thought experiment, where 
sensitive parameters are calibrated in an attempt to match the magnitude of results found in 
previous work. Willingness-to-pay results from the constrained and unconstrained models can be 
found in Table B.8.  
The calibration exercise demonstrates that the model is highly sensitive to each of the 
parameters that capture an aspect of substitution in the model. With constraints imposed on these 
elasticities, the model produces results with a magnitude that are mostly consistent with 
expectations. Willingness-to-pay is an order of magnitude higher than those found in Evans et al. 
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(2017), but this is not entirely surprising. Due to the nature of the nonmarginal increases of 
aquaculture between the baseline and counterfactual data, larger WTP estimates make sense. 
Additionally, the substantive differences in WTP between the partial and general equilibrium 
settings are intuitive; the partial equilibrium WTP does not allow households to respond to 
changes in amenities by moving communities where the general equilibrium framework does. 
For each region, the general equilibrium WTP is higher than that of the partial equilibrium 
suggesting that giving households a locational choice is important when the impacts of large-
scale environmental changes are being estimated.  
The unconstrained model also produces relative changes in community price which can 
be used to understand how changes in aquaculture and correlated amenities might be perceived 
by coastal resource users. By examining community level changes in rank ordering given a 
change in the landscape, it is possible to determine how coastal communities may react to a more 
general redistribution of their coastal resources. Communities who may benefit the most from a 
redistribution of coastal space see improvements in their relative community price, while those 
communities who see their relative price fall may prefer to see the coastal economy remain the 
same. Note that changes in community ranking cannot be induced through endogenous variables 
due to the structure of the ranking instruments (Kuminoff, 2013a). The effects of changing 
aquaculture are most salient when viewed through a relative price change. Figures B.4. through 
B.6. illustrate how changes to aquaculture in the calibrated model illicit changes in community 
price (and price ranking). Additionally, tables detailing the price changes can be found in Table 
B.9.  
3.7.2. Sensitivity tests 
We assert that the unconstrained model’s results may be inconsistent with expectations 
because of a misspecification of the public good. Note that the structure of the model leaves it 
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especially vulnerable to omitted variable bias (the variation of endogenous omitted variables is 
captured only by other variables within the public good, not an error term). To isolate potential 
problematic variable(s) within the model, several model specifications and counterfactual 
scenarios are estimated. First, we estimate WTP in the unconstrained model with the observed 
counterfactual data, which yields a mean general equilibrium WTP of -$∞ for two of the regions. 
In response, a second model estimates WTP with only a five percent increase in the provision of 
aquaculture, while holding all other variables (including community income and housing 
expenditure quantiles) constant. This produces the same result, indicating the variable intending 
to capture aquaculture may be capturing much more. The way aquaculture enters the model can 
have an impact on results, so both specifications found in the Public Good section of this thesis 
are modeled. We find improvements in magnitude from -$∞ to -$171,860 in the Damariscotta 
River region with the second specification.  
3.8. Future work 
This chapter highlights the sensitivity of a group of models that is seeking further 
validation in the economic literature. Our results were not in line with those of previous studies, 
which could be due to a misspecification of the public good or a product of imposing high levels 
of structure on a relatively small sample. We have some suggestions for moving forward that 
will help transform this model into a useful tool for policy analysis. Of all the decisions the 
econometrician makes when constructing a pure-characteristics equilibrium sorting model, two 
stand out.  
The first: deciding which amenities should be included in the public good. We largely 
followed the literature in constructing the public good for the model presented in this thesis, but 
the literature has not yet examined an area as rural as coastal Maine. This led to unique 
challenges. Variables representing the urban-rural spectrum have been used throughout the 
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sorting model literature and typically use amenities like population density and access to urban 
amenities. In generally urban environments, the researcher can often find colorful variation in 
these measures which are helpful in explaining relative differences in the level of urbanity. In 
overwhelmingly rural environments like the one being presented here, standard measures of 
urban and rural do not provide helpful variation. What is needed is a different way to measure 
the urban-rural divide. Moving forward, this public good should include relative measures of 
urban and rural that better capture the availability of Maine’s “urban” amenities.  
A larger potential issue with the public good could be the omission of amenities 
endogenous to aquaculture. While data is hard to come by, it is imperative that the model control 
for other uses of coastal space that could be correlated with aquaculture production. First and 
foremost, the public good must include variables that account for commercial fishing which is a 
hugely important component of Maine’s coastal economy. Additionally, much of the 
infrastructure that Maine’s aquaculture industry depends on is primarily used by commercial 
fishers. In its current state, the aquaculture variable is likely capturing nearly all of the effects of 
correlated coastal resources, which in turn is causing the model estimates to explode. The 
inclusion of variables that capture commercial fishing output may well solve many of the 
model’s problems.  
 The second decision that can heavily influence results is the choice of community. Again, 
in this thesis we follow the literature by using school districts as our unit of analysis. This is a 
popular choice because school quality is widely considered a major factor in determining 
household locational choices. However, there are three possible issues with this choice in this 
thesis. First, school districts in Maine are poorly defined. District boundaries are constantly being 
drawn and then redrawn as populations and budgets change. There is also a litany of 
impressively small school districts that inhabit the islands of coastal Maine and the more rural 
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areas of the coast. Second, nearly all of the data used in this thesis are gathered at the census tract 
or municipal level. Choosing a different unit of analysis may reduce measurement error. Third, 
the amenity of interest (aquaculture) is regulated at a municipal level. The leasing process 
encourages aquaculture production areas to vary spatially across municipalities, not school 
districts. You may have a school district composed of two municipalities where one allows 
aquaculture and the other does not. There would be two opposing “community” preferences, but 
they would be aggregated into a single entity, diluting the true preferences of both groups.   
 Pure-characteristics equilibrium sorting models are fickle in nature and require deep 
thought and care in their preparation. The work presented in this thesis can be built upon to 
provide even deeper insights into aquaculture siting decisions. Modifications to the public good 
that fall outside of the current literature may help produce estimates that are more compatible 
with previous work. In particular, careful consideration should be given to possible endogenous 
regressors to aquaculture. A change in the spatial unit of analysis may also be prudent. In a break 
with tradition, it may be necessary to aggregate and analyze data at the municipal level to 
account for the siting process. The resulting model could have powerful policy implications by 
informing policymakers about how to socially optimize aquaculture siting decisions.  
3.9. Conclusions 
This thesis chapter estimates a general equilibrium WTP for nonmarginal changes in 
aquaculture production across three regions of coastal Maine. A pure-characteristics equilibrium 
sorting model is identified as the correct tool for analysis and is used to model household 
preferences for aquaculture and a slate of other goods. However, the willingness-to-pay estimates 
produced were of a different order of magnitude than expected. By constraining certain 
parameters as part of a thought experiment, the model was able to produce results that were of 
the expected magnitude, suggesting that the model’s sorting process may be particularly 
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sensitive to the values assumed by those parameters. Still, we learn a great deal about the 
preferences of households within each community by examining relative changes in community 
price.  
The presence of omitted variables in the public good can have massive implications for 
the weights the model places on the variables that are included. In this case, the omission of 
measures of critical coastal resources like commercial fishing and other endogenous covariates 
may be hyperinflating the impact aquaculture has on the housing decision. Additionally, the 
sensitivity of the model to the constraints we place on parameters can have huge effects on 
results. For example, it is possible to constrain price and income elasticities, and the demand 
intercept such that the model produces results (more) in line with expectations, however this 
undermines one of the main advantages of the model in that the parameters are estimated, not 
calibrated. More work needs to be done to extract the effects of aquaculture from other coastal 
resources that are more impactful on housing markets. 
 Still, this chapter produces some compelling qualitative results. The model uncovered 
relative changes in community price that can still be useful to policymakers. By examining 
relative changes in the price on a community by community basis, it is still possible to interpret 
how sensitive a community might be to changes in its coastal system. The implications of this 
cannot be understated. Expanding aquaculture production in the State of Maine is best achieved 
if the heterogeneity in preferences of coastal resource users is used to the advantage of 
policymakers and stakeholders. Coordinating siting locations in communities where aquaculture 
improves the quality of a community is mutually beneficial to the homeowners and the growers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis explores two serious impediments to sustainably growing Maine’s aquaculture 
sector. In doing so, it also contributes to two bodies of literature: one focused on off-farm labor 
participation and one focused on valuing environmental resources within an equilibrium sorting 
framework.  
 Chapter 2 looked to explain how the propensity of aquaculture growers to participate in 
off-farm labor varies along a number of dimensions. We tested a series of discrete choice and 
count models to identify important factors driving both the decision to participate in off-farm 
labor, and if so, how much to participate. This study found that off-farm labor in New England’s 
aquaculture sector is driven by many of the same factors that are known to influence off-farm 
labor decisions within an agricultural context. The study also finds that variables that measure 
marine climate and the amount of information growers receive are important in determining how 
much off-farm labor a grower will supply. We develop a new analytical approach to estimate 
parameters by introducing new and relevant variables to a traditional off-farm labor model and 
by utilizing count models, which are rare in the literature, to estimate the effects of the 
covariates.  
 Chapter 3 sought to uncover the effects of changes in aquaculture production area in three 
regions of coastal Maine. Building off the work of Evans et al. (2017), we constructed a model 
aimed at understanding how nonmarginal increases might influence welfare on a community by 
community basis. Using a pure-characteristics equilibrium sorting model, we estimated 
willingness-to-pay in both partial and general equilibrium settings. Results were not of the 
expected magnitude, which led to intensive sensitivity checks of the model. We determined that 
aquaculture is likely endogenous to other coastal amenities that were not specified. Still, a deeper 
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understand of aquaculture’s role in the coastal economy is gained. Communities have drastically 
different responses to changes in their coastal economic system, suggesting a wide range of 
preferences may be held over how coastal space is used. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES FROM CHAPTER 2 
Table A.1. Summary statistics for variables used in off-farm labor analysis.: Data was 
collected in a 2016 survey of all oyster growers in New England. One hundred and forty-five 
usable responses were returned. For each response, three years of information was included. We 
collect information on demographic and business characteristics, climate, and local economic 
conditions. Each observation (N) is one year of data from a grower.  
Description Variable N Mean SD 
Non-Binary Variables 
Average weekly hours spent doing off-farm 
labor  
OFL 423 15.28 19.54 
Number of years farm has been in operation YearsActive 420 10.00 9.23 
Annual oyster harvest (thousands of pieces) TOH 300 469.8 1103.3 
Age of respondent Age 422 56.33 13.97 
Square of the respondents age Age_sq 422 3367.60 1510.08 
Number of children who are of school age 
(below 18) 
SAC 417 0.46 0.87 
Number of years of education the grower has 
received, starting at first grade 
YOS 420 15.19 2.44 
Number of people per square mile Popdensity 418 45.82 113.04 
Inches of rain a farm receives annually Precip 420 47.92 5.38 
Average water temperature of farm measured 
in Celsius  
Water_Temp 423 5.16 1.31 
Percentage of adults in a zipcode population 
that is unemployed 
Employment 393 8.61 8.46 
Distance in meters to nearest zipcode 
population of 10,000 or more 
Urban 417 7.55 7.65 
Number of times listed by another grower in 
the same state (Information sharing) 
SNL 423 2.43 2.75 
Dummy Variables 
Grower operates in Maine  Maine 423 0.23 0.42 
Grower raises other species  OtherSpecies 420 0.19 0.39 
Grower is a man Gender 423 0.89 0.32 
Grower is married or engaged Married 423 0.77 0.42 
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Table A.2. Probit and logit results.: Probit and logit models are estimated to determine 
significant factors in a grower’s choice to participate or not participate in off-farm labor. 
Estimates can be interpreted for sign and direction, but cannot be understood as marginal effects. 
Variable descriptions can be found in Table A.1.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter 
    Probit Model Logit Model 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Maine Dummy -0.6175 0.4830 -0.9552 0.8369 
Years Active 0.0334** 0.0154 0.0584** 0.0263 
Other Species Dummy 0.8111** 0.3186 1.4955** 0.5936 
Total Oysters Hauled (thousands) -0.0003* 0.0002 -0.0006* 0.0003 
Age 0.0772 0.0577 0.1169 0.0991 
Age Sq. Interaction -0.0010* 0.0005 -0.0016* 0.0009 
Gender 0.8188** 0.3238 1.4130** 0.6094 
Married/Engaged Dummy 1.0700*** 0.2614 1.8008*** 0.4422 
School Aged Children 0.1915 0.1337 0.3400 0.2323 
Years of Schooling 0.0934* 0.0550 0.1581* 0.0953 
Population Density (thousands/sq_mile) 11.1537*** 4.4197 18.4381** 7.6905 
Precipitation 0.0089 0.0274 0.01600 0.0478 
Water Temperature (C) -0.5677*** 0.2149 -0.9518*** 0.3662 
ZIP Unemployment -0.0059 0.0112 -0.0099 0.0183 
Urban 0.0077 0.0146 0.0084 0.0254 
Information Sharing 0.3057*** 0.0633 0.5181*** 0.1087 
2013 1.3831** 0.6753 2.3246** 1.1447 
2014 0.6777* 0.3964 1.1677* 0.6723 
Constant -3.0914 2.0910 -4.8747 3.5114 
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Table A.3. Estimates from count models and zero-inflated count models.: Parameter estimates are recovered from the 
Poisson model, the negative binomial model, the ZIP model, and the ZINB model. The positive finds section of the ZIP and 
ZINB models can be compared to those of the Poisson and negative binomial. The logit selection section of the ZIP and ZINB 
findings are the results from a model estimating the probability a grower will choose to participate in off-farm labor. These 
results can be interpreted as a percent change in the conditional mean of off-farm labor hours worked. AIC and BIC statistics 
are also reported, and are helpful in determining the best model. Variable descriptions can be found in Table A.1. 
Parameter Poisson Model Negative Binomial Model ZIP Model ZINB Model 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
                                                             Positive Finds 
Maine Dummy -0.1511** 0.068208 -0.6047 0.56227 -0.0354 0.0741 -0.1751 0.2231 
Years Active -0.0038* 0.001972 -0.0029 0.01847 -0.0187*** 0.0021 -0.0237*** 0.0071 
Other Species Dummy 0.4762*** 0.034041 0.7507** 0.32794 0.09239*** 0.0345 0.0876 0.1171 
Total Oysters Hauled 
(thousands) -4.52E-04*** 3.63E-08 -7.10E-04*** 2.51E-07 -2.95E-04*** 4.37E-05 -3.18E-04** 1.24E-04 
Age 0.1327*** 0.010413 0.0867 0.0639 0.0949*** 0.0094 0.0937*** 0.0275 
Age Sq. Interaction -0.0014*** 0.0001 -0.0011**  -0.0009*** 8.95E-05 -0.0009*** 0.0003 
Gender 1.0443*** 0.071397 1.3564*** 0.0006 0.7918*** 0.0715 0.9555*** 0.2157 
Married/Engaged Dummy 0.2945*** 0.041298 0.6817** 0.4110 -0.0984** 0.0428 -0.0994 0.1375 
School Aged Children 0.0139 0.017456 -0.06305 0.3055 0.0032 0.0169 -0.0630 0.0584 
Years of Schooling 0.1252*** 0.007336 0.1760*** 0.1425 0.0980*** 0.0078 0.1130*** 0.0259 
Population Density 
(thousands/sq_mile) 0.0013*** 0.00017 0.0016 0.0643 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 
Precipitation -0.0115*** 0.004035 0.0056 0.0014 -0.0129*** 0.0042 -0.0140 0.0137 
Water Temperature (C) -0.2217*** 0.023923 -0.5746*** 0.0314 -0.1790*** 0.0246 -0.2416*** 0.0778 
ZIP Unemployment -0.0009 0.001927 0.0077 0.2135 -0.0053*** 0.0019 -0.0020 0.0060 
Urban 0.0060*** 0.002193 -0.0224 0.0136 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0041 0.0072 
Information Sharing 0.0275*** 0.007119 0.1435** 0.0167 -0.0585*** 0.0074 -0.0554** 0.0236 
2013 0.4016*** 0.07735 1.4089** 0.0652 0.3906*** 0.0809 0.5109* 0.2617 
2014 0.2054*** 0.051105 0.7587* 0.7094 0.2132*** 0.0519 0.2773** 0.1658 
Constant -1.6275*** 0.369447 -0.8960 0.4242 0.5809* 0.3415 0.6968 0.9872 
                 Logit Selection 
Maine Dummy     0.9539 0.8370 0.935903 0.8425 
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***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Table A.3. Continued 
       
Years Active     -0.0584** 0.0263 -0.06286 0.0282 
Other Species Dummy 
(thousands) 
    -1.4959** 0.5937 -1.64653 0.6953 
Total Oysters Hauled     5.66E-04* 3.07E-04 5.56E-04 3.10E-04 
Age     -0.1167 0.0991 -0.11196 0.0999 
Age Sq. Interaction     0.0016* 0.0009 0.0016 0.0009 
 
Gender 
    -1.4119*** 0.6096 -1.2157 0.7586 
Married/Engaged Dummy     -1.8014 0.4422 -1.8356 0.4533 
School Aged Children     -0.3400* 0.2323 -0.3691 0.2476 
Years of Schooling     -0.1582** 0.0953 -0.1535 0.0965 
Population Density     -0.0184 0.0077 -0.0192 0.0080 
Precipitation     -0.0160*** 0.0478 -0.0168 0.0481 
Water Temperature (C)     0.9519 0.3662 0.9746 0.3749 
ZIP Unemployment     0.0099 0.0183 0.0094 0.0184 
Urban     -0.0084 0.0254 -0.0099 0.0260 
Information Sharing     -0.5180 0.1087 -0.5160 0.1093 
2013     -2.3246 1.1446 -2.3881 1.1635 
2014     -1.1677 0.6723 -1.2014 0.6838 
Constant     4.8718 3.5112 4.5488 3.5826 
Summary statistics 
N 272  272  272  272  
AIC  5588.242  1899.421  2348.751  1662.008  
BIC 5656.753  1971.537  2485.772  1802.635  
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Table A.4. ZINB marginal effects.: Marginal effects from the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model are estimated. Coefficients can be interpreted as the expected change in the number of off-
farm labor hours resulting from a one unit change in non-binary variables. Binary variables can 
be interpreted as the expected change in off-farm labor hours worked when compared to the 
base. Variable descriptions can be found in Table A.1. 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error 
Maine Dummy -4.9345 6.7170 
Years Active -0.6947*** 0.2148 
Other Species Dummy 2.9896 3.5075 
Total Oysters Hauled 
(thousands) 9.64E-3** 3.83E-3 
Age 0.0231 0.1197 
Gender 27.5759*** 6.1482 
Married/Engaged Dummy -2.9613 4.1602 
School Aged Children -1.7331 1.7226 
Years of Schooling 3.3825*** 0.8160 
Population Density 
(thousands/sq_mile) 0.0129 0.0156 
Precipitation -0.4332 0.4128 
Water Temperature (C) -7.3150*** 2.4159 
ZIP Unemployment -0.0646 0.1820 
Urban -0.1103 0.2120 
Information Sources -1.7125** 0.7222 
2013 15.4488* 7.9890 
2014 8.4042* 5.0496 
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Table A.5. Likelihood ratio tests and Vuong tests results.: The Vuong tests compare the zero-
inflated models to their respective standard models. Results indicate that the zero inflated models 
are the appropriate choice. Likelihood ratio tests are used to test if alpha is significantly different 
from zero, which justifies the use of a negative binomial distribution instead of a Poisson 
distribution. The likelihood ratio test suggest that the alpha is different from zero, and thus the 
data not equidispersed.   
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model  Preferred Model Likelihood Ratio Test 
Poisson vs Negative Binomial Negative Binomial chibar^2 = 3698.75*** 
   
Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial vs. Zero-Inflated 
Poisson 
Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial 
chibar^2 = 686.40*** 
 Vuong Test 
Poisson vs Zero- Inflated 
Poisson 
Zero-Inflated Poisson z = 11.66*** 
   
Negative Binomial vs. Zero-
Inflated Negative Binomial 
Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial 
z = 10.86*** 
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Figure A.1. Weekly off-farm labor participation by respondent.: Provision of off-farm labor 
(hours) was collected in a 2016 survey of New England Oyster Growers. Three distinct classes 
emerge: one at zero hours, one between zero and 40 hours, and one at 40 or more hours.   
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APPENDIX B: TABLES AND FIGURES FROM CHAPTER 3 
Table B.1. Differences between the three types of sorting models (modified from Kuminoff 
et al. (2013)).: Different sorting models are distinguished by their treatment of the household 
choice, the treatment of substitute goods, the presence of a budget constraint, and the instruments 
used to deal with endogenous sorting among other things.  
 Random Utility 
(RU) 
Calibrated Sorting 
(CS) 
Pure-Characteristics 
(PC) 
Choice House | Job House, school, vote House  
Budget Constraint Yes No Yes 
Differentiation 
Type 
Horizontal Horizontal Vertical 
Model Instruments Attributes of 
substitutes and 
amenity discontinuity 
Production function Income Rank 
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Table B.2. Household summary statistics by region.: Data from housing transactions from 
January 2012 through December 2014 was used to determine relative community price. Distance 
to Water measures the distance from each household to the closest planar point of coastal Maine. 
Home 
Characteristics 
Casco Bay 
(N = 6,112) 
Damariscotta River 
(N = 2,316) 
Penobscot Bay 
(N = 1,678) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sales Price ($1,000s) 318.53 280.11 216.28 229.36 272.99 328.93 
Lot Size (acres) 1.22 5.02 4.07 45.93 3.21 7.27 
Living Area (square 
feet) 
2030.85 981.50 1775.04 866.20 1898.20 1068.46 
Bathrooms 1.99 0.87 1.77 0.803 1.92 0.95 
Bedrooms 3.25 0.84 2.98 0.85 3.04 1.00 
Age (years) 59.06 45.72 70.56 82.62 73.18 90.57 
Distance to Water 
(miles) 
1.03 1.39 1.02 1.38 1.03 1.41 
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Table B.3.: Fixed-effects hedonic regression. Hedonic analyses are used to find the relative 
price of each community by controlling for each household’s structural, neighborhood, and 
environmental characteristics. The base estimate for each region is zero. The school district with 
the smallest coefficient estimate is normalized to one. Annual fixed-effects are included to 
capture major shifts in the real estate market between 2012 and 2014. 
Control Variables Casco Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Lot size (100 acres) 0.713*** 0.093 -0.039 0.024 1.79*** .202 
Square feet (1,000s) 0.266*** 0.009 0.283*** 0.019 .156*** 0.021 
Bathrooms 0.178*** 0.009 0.239*** 0.021 0.311*** 0.024 
Bedrooms -0.047*** 0.007 -0.022 0.016 -0.040** 0.019 
Age (50 years) -0.047*** 0.015 -0.103*** 0.011 -0.110*** 0.014 
Age squared 0.007*** 0.003 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 
Distance to water(miles) -0.072*** 0.009 -0.030 .022 -0.112*** 0.027 
Distance sq to water .010*** 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.015*** 0.004 
Casco Districts 
Long Island Base    -     
Brunswick -0.420*** 0.091     
Cape Elizabeth 0.062 0.092     
Falmouth -0.157 0.092     
Portland -0.153* 0.091     
South Portland -0.171* 0.091     
Yarmouth -0.016 0.092     
RSU 51 -0.117 0.092     
RSU 75 -0.270*** 0.091     
Chebeague -0.028 0.119     
RSU 01 -0.606*** 0.091     
RSU 05 -0.135 0.092     
West Bath -0.337*** 0.100     
Damariscotta Districts       
Augusta Base    -     
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Table B.3. Continued     
Boothbay 0.721*** 0.042     
Bristol 0.728*** 0.051     
Edgecomb 0.557*** 0.084     
Georgetown 0.747*** 0.077    
Damariscotta 0.518*** 0.072     
Nobleboro 0.609*** 0.080     
RSU 11 -0.045 0.041     
RSU 40 0.235*** 0.043     
South Bristol 0.877*** 0.077     
Southport 1.108*** 0.101     
RSU 02 0.195*** 0.039     
RSU 12 0.263*** 0.042     
Newcastle 0.584*** 0.070     
Bremen 0.637*** 0.104     
Penobscot Districts       
Brooklin Base    -     
Brooksville 0.330** 0.155     
Castine 0.033 0.145     
Deer Isle-Stonington 0.046 0.115     
Islesboro 0.113 0.159     
Penobscot -0.186 0.153     
RSU 28 0.111 0.106     
RSU 07 0.400** 0.201     
RSU 08 -0.038 0.140     
Sedgewick -0.249* 0.143     
RSU 13 -0.219** 0.104     
RSU 20 -0.564*** 0.113     
RSU 25 -0.682*** 0.108     
Lincolnville -0.176 0.116     
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Table B.4. Descriptive statistics for school districts.: Data is collected on housing expenditures, income, and components of the 
public good for each region. Housing expenditures and income are reported as quartiles.  
 
 
 
 Casco Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
 (N = 13) (N = 15) (N = 14) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Community size 
(pop share) 
0.077 0.027 0.022 0.126 0.056 0.022 0.014 0.109 0.063 0.012 0.051 0.083 
Community price 
(relative) 
1.451 0.201 1.000 1.687 1.558 0.334 1.000 2.187 1.629 0.317 1.000 2.165 
Per pupil 
expenditures ($) 
12503.88 961.80 11150.08 14912.81 12618.19 2208.88 8959.69 17888.92 14191.33 6724.915 6783.85 27668.85 
School choice 
(dummy) 
0.231 0.439 0.000 1.000 0.667 0.488 0.000 1.000 0.429 0.514 0.000 1.000 
High school 
graduation rate 
(%) 
94.86 3.15 89.27 98.59 93.02 2.52 86.18 95.83 91.05 3.76 81.33 95.96 
Seasonal homes 
(%) 
51.0 25.7 17.4 98.1 60.0 24.9 00.0 86.1 64.6 23.7 12.8 84.8 
Libraries (#) 3.31 4.59 0.00 17.00 3.40 2.56 0.00 10.00 2.43 2.85 1.00 11.00 
Distance to 
hospital (meters) 3.824 1.732 1.478 6.292 5.103 2.072 1.697 9.442 8.727 3.615 1.703 15.262 
NSSP closure (%) 12.3 15.9 0.05 60.2 10.4 8.9 3.9 30.1 8.3 6.6 0.6 26.2 
AQ (acres) 8.846 13.923 0.000 51.910 33.084 77.060 0.000 250.258 6.244 10.148 0.000 34.730 
Coastline (miles) 83.240 112.972 6.660 394.410 64.068 47.141 1.939 141.577 88.871 87.062 7.304 284.276 
Income 25 ($) 38782 15090 20000 62500 28166 2914 21049 30000 23169 4305 20000 33392 
Income 50 ($) 60368 14224 34167 83217 51703 6749 41250 62500 47870 8939 36250 62500 
Income 75 ($) 111831 39032 62500 175000 81766 7740 62802 87500 78678 14528 62500 112500 
Housing 25 ($) 198485 57094 111500 290500 144508 45350 74500 226500 142164 41327 74000 206000 
Housing 50 ($) 276982 86422 166500 406250 223302 83564 111000 419000 222979 71048 115000 352500 
Housing 75 ($) 390086 122072 243250 576725 348865 200217 142200 875000 391534 161609 165750 761500 
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Table B.5. Parameter calibration.: Some parameters of the equilibrium sorting model are 
calibrated as part of thought experiment whose purpose is to examine the responsiveness of the 
model to certain parameters. Elasticities for constant price (!), income ("), and the CES 
substitution parameter (%) were the focus of this exercise. 
 
Parameter Evans (2011) Sieg et al. (2004) Calibrated  
 Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model IV  &'() 10.803 
[0.015] 
10.809 
[0.013] 
10.883 
[0.042] 
10.765 
[0.038] 
10.782 
[0.066] 
10.888 
[0.051] 
10.829 
[0.035] 
 
*'()+  0.381 
[-0.008] 
0.37 
[-0.010] 
0.326 
[0.016] 
0.652 
[0.023] 
0.745 
[0.019] 
0.69 
[0.023] 
0.755 
[0.013] 
 
&'(, 0.038 
[0.004] 
0.059 
[0.006] 
0.051 
[0.007] 
0.408 
[0.191] 
0.833 
[0.172] 
0.562 
[0.229] 
0.76 
[0.199] 
 
*'(,+  0.063 
[-0.001] 
0.084 
[-0.002] 
0.071 
[0.007] 
0.514 
[0.053] 
0.357 
[0.025] 
0.492 
[0.024] 
0.355 
[0.027] 
 
- -0.326 
[0.005] 
-0.32 
[0.004] 
-0.309 
[0.023] 
-0.219 
[0.058] 
-0.247 
[0.097] 
-0.247 
[0.097] 
-0.207 
[0.029] 
 
% -0.019 
[0.000] 
-0.023 
[0.000] 
-0.021 
[0.001] 
-0.046 
[0.003] 
-0.022 
[0.002] 
-0.03 
[0.002] 
-0.023 
[0.002] 
-0.03 . 1.39 
[0.017] 
2.31 
[0.022] 
1.91 
[0.112] 
2.909 
[0.266] 
2.817 
[0.323] 
2.435 
[0.445] 
2.971 
[0.444] 
 
! -0.231 
[0.016] 
-0.584 
[0.023] 
-0.411 
[0.038] 
-0.116 
[0.043] 
-0.039 
[0.015] 
-0.019 
[0.083] 
-0.037 
[0.017] 
-0.02 " 0.783 
[0.002] 
0.795 
[0.003] 
0.774 
[0.010] 
0.762 
[0.009] 
0.734 
[0.011] 
0.752 
[0.012] 
0.729 
[0.014] 
0.75 
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Table B.6. Unconstrained parameter estimates.: Parameters are estimated with a one-stage generalized  
methods of moments (GMM) estimator. Parameter estimates are used to simulate, then sort, households.  
Parameter Casco Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
 Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic !"#$ 11.001 0.012 954.960 10.791 0.009 1167.390 10.689 0.014 778.590 %"#$&  -0.650 0.066 -9.855 -0.526 0.040 -13.205 0.753 0.061 16.456 !"#$ 0.841 0.113 7.417 0.710 0.734 0.967 1.894 0.626 3.026 %"#$&  0.112 0.028 4.053 0.347 0.171 2.022 1.074 0.152 5.085 ' -1.106 0.142 -7.763 -1.746 0.563 -3.102 -0.622 0.361 -6.009 ()*+, 1.833 0.094 19.420 1.100 0.389 2.831 2.426 0.339 7.148 -./0112		456278$ -0.972 0.178 -5.454 0.182 0.195 0.934 -0.613 0.837 -0.733 -97:0	./0112	;<6= 1.614 0.096 16.796 -0.029 0.343 -0.086 1.809 0.540 3.348 -.>6?1@62	91A>? 0.422 0.115 3.668 -1.661 0.423 -3.929 0.984 0.621 1.584 -B<C6@	D -0.201 0.026 -7.871 0.591 0.459 1.287 0.143 0.250 0.569 -B<C6@	& -0.503 0.180 -2.801 0.183 0.367 0.499 -0.103 0.077 -1.347 -E68><		456278$ 2.692 0.266 10.103 -0.694 0.413 -1.681 -0.708 0.391 -1.811 -FG56/5285<> -0.103 0.010 -10.076 0.505 0.240 2.108 -0.077 0.073 -1.049 -H16?827@> 0.000 0.001 0.404 0.025 0.006 3.983 0.013 0.011 1.205 I -0.071 0.009 -7.666 -0.079 0.027 -2.906 -0.091 0.031 -2.898 J 4.941 0.242 20.409 3.794 0.696 5.451 2.835 0.530 5.349 K 0.094 0.137 0.685 0.734 0.114 6.412 0.398 0.154 2.578 L 0.772 0.004 184.440 0.759 0.020 37.568 0.804 0.021 38.596 
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Table B.7. Constrained parameter estimates.: Most parameters are estimated with a one-stage generalized  
methods of moments (GMM) estimator. However, elasticities for constant price (M), income (-), and the CES 
substitution parameter (I) are held fixed. Values were determined by consulting Sieg et al. (2004) and Evans  
(2011). Parameter estimates are used to simulate, then sort, households.  
Parameter Cacso Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
 Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic Estimate Std. Err. T-statistic !"#$ 10.994 0.014 719.840 10.810 0.013 861.450 10.691 0.010 1045.400 %"#$&  0.566 0.061 21.840 0.570 0.106 9.983 0.779 0.060 15.102 !"#$ 0.021 0.626 0.082 0.793 0.550 1.441 4.329 1.207 3.586 %"#$&  1.305 0.152 12.370 0.948 0.138 5.543 1.349 0.229 6.181 ' -0.075 0.361 -2.689 -0.290 0.084 -7.365 -0.316 0.133 -5.793 ()*+, 0.158 0.339 0.725 1.982 0.802 2.472 0.232 0.234 0.992 -./0112		456278$ -1.475 0.837 -0.592 0.999 0.662 1.510 -1.180 1.369 -0.862 -97:0	./0112	;<6= -0.954 0.540 -2.887 -1.194 0.763 -1.564 0.415 0.846 0.491 -E1<P7@:	E68><Q<1@8 3.195 0.621 7.477 0.170 0.124 1.369 -1.015 1.282 -0.792 -B<C6@	D 0.622 0.250 4.678 -1.431 1.317 -1.087 0.136 0.174 0.782 -B<C6@	& 1.017 0.077 1.634 -0.286 4.132 -0.069 -0.257 2.821 -0.091 -E68><		456278$ 6.678 0.391 92.510 5.573 0.092 60.378 5.964 0.117 51.022 -FG56/5285<> -0.369 0.073 -2.264 2.438 4.102 0.594 0.004 0.444 0.008 -H16?827@> -0.004 0.011 -4.781 0.062 0.023 2.677 -0.017 0.013 -1.282 I -0.030   -0.030   -0.030   J 9.100 0.530 1.875 10.915 6.861 1.591 -5.224 19.427 -0.269 K -0.020   -0.020   -0.020   L 0.750   0.750   0.750   
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Table B.8. Willingness-to-pay estimates.: Willingness-to-pay is estimated in two sets of 
models. The unconstrained WTP is estimated by models who had all of their parameters 
generated directly by the data. The constrained models present WTP that is part of a thought 
experiment geared towards matching expectations and other results in the literature. Willingness-
to-pay is presented as a regional mean, aggregated up from individual household level. 
 Casco Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
Constrained Partial WTP -$53,266 -$53,303 $53,135 
Constrained General WTP $16,009 $16,128 $16,176 
Unconstrained Partial WTP -$56,082 -$146,580 -$278,450 
Unconstrained General WTP -$∞ -$∞ -$∞ 
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Table B.9. Community price rank changes.: Changes in community price correspond to 
changes in relative community quality. The model estimates observed counterfactual data to 
produce the new community rankings.  
Casco Bay Damariscotta River Penobscot Bay 
District Rank New Rank District Rank New Rank District Rank New Rank 
Cape 
Elizabeth 
1 12 Southport 1 8 RSU 07 1 14 
Long Island 2 13 South Bristol 2 14 Brooksville 2 12 
Yarmouth 3 1 Boothbay 3 2 Islesboro 3 7 
Falmouth 4 5 Georgetown 4 1 RSU 28 4 1 
Chebeague 
Island 
5 4 Bristol 5 10 RSU 08 5 8 
RSU 05 6 9 Nobleboro 6 12 Castine 6 3 
RSU 51 7 10 Bremen 7 7 Deer Isle-
Stonington 
7 5 
Portland 8 11 Edgecomb 8 11 Brooklin 8 13 
South 
Portland 
9 2 Newcastle 9 3 Penobscot 9 10 
RSU 75 10 7 Damariscotta 10 15 Lincolnville 10 9 
West Bath 11 3 RSU 12 11 4 RSU 13 11 2 
Brunswick 12 8 RSU 40 12 5 Sedgwick 12 11 
RSU 01 13 6 RSU 02 13 6 RSU 20 13 4 
   Augusta 14 9 RSU 25 14 6 
   RSU 11 15 13    
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Figure B.1. Boundary indifference illustration (modified from Kuminoff et al. (2013)).: 
Boundary indifference is a condition necessary to induce sorting in an equilibrium sorting model. 
It states that given a continuum of households, there to be households with given taste and 
income that are indifferent between communities j and j+1, which are adjacent in relative price.  
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Figure B.2. Household sorting (modified from Epple and Sieg (1999) & Evans (2011)).: 
Households a, b, and c are sorted into communities "#,	"%, and "&. Community "#has the lowest 
quality and "& has the highest quality. Household a holds the lowest income but still sorts into 
the community of the highest quality because it holds the strongest preferences over the public 
good. Household c sorts into "# despite having the highest income because it holds the weakest 
preferences over the public good. This example is illustrative of how a household’s community 
choice is jointly determined by preferences for the community-specific amenities and income. 
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Figure B.3. Study area by region.: There are three distinct and adjacent regions for which 
willingness-to-pay is estimated: Casco Bay (blue), Damariscotta River Region (red), and 
Penobscot Bay (red). Within each region, communities are considered substitutes for one 
another.  The inlay map describes where these regions fall within the broader context of Maine’s 
coastline. 
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Figure B.4. Casco Bay rank changes.: Changes in community price rankings can demonstrate 
how changes in aquaculture might benefit or harm homeowners in any given community. 
Communities shaded the darkest will benefit the most from expanding aquaculture and 
communities shaded the most lightly are harmed the most. Each community’s change in relative 
price is marked.  
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Figure B.5. Damariscotta River region rank changes.: Changes in community price rankings 
can demonstrate how changes in aquaculture might benefit or harm homeowners in any given 
community. Communities shaded the darkest will benefit the most from expanding aquaculture 
and communities shaded the most lightly are harmed the most. Each community’s change in 
relative price is marked.  
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Figure B.6. Penobscot Bay rank changes.: Changes in community price rankings can 
demonstrate how changes in aquaculture might benefit or harm homeowners in any given 
community. Communities shaded the darkest will benefit the most from expanding aquaculture 
and communities shaded the most lightly are harmed the most. Each community’s change in 
relative price is marked.  
 
 
 
100 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR 
Avery Cole was born in Bangor, Maine on September 22, 1993. He was raised in Orono, 
Maine and graduated from Orono High School in 2011. He attended the University of University 
of Connecticut before transferring home to the University of Maine, where he graduated in 2016 
with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science. He began his work with aquaculture at the 
Aquaculture Research Institute, where he designed, distributed and analyzed economic impact 
surveys focused on Maine’s industry. After a year spent bartending and traveling, he returned to 
Maine and entered the Economics graduate program at The University of Maine in the fall of 
2017. After receiving his degree, Avery will be joining DNV GL., an international maritime and 
energy consulting firm, to begin his career in the field of energy consulting. Avery is a candidate 
for the Master of Science degree in Economics from the University of Maine in August 2019. 
